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Abstract. Threshold cryptography is a fundamental distributed computational paradigm for enhancing
the availability and the security of cryptographic public-key schemes. It does it by dividing private keys
into n shares handed out to distinct servers. In threshold signature schemes, a set of at least t + 1 ≤ n
servers is needed to produce a valid digital signature. Availability is assured by the fact that any subset of
t+1 servers can produce a signature when authorized. At the same time, the scheme should remain robust
(in the fault tolerance sense) and unforgeable (cryptographically) against up to t corrupted servers; i.e.,
it adds quorum control to traditional cryptographic services and introduces redundancy. Originally, most
practical threshold signatures have a number of demerits: They have been analyzed in a static corruption
model (where the set of corrupted servers is fixed at the very beginning of the attack), they require
interaction, they assume a trusted dealer in the key generation phase (so that the system is not fully
distributed), or they suffer from certain overheads in terms of storage (large share sizes). In this paper,
we construct practical fully distributed (the private key is born distributed), non-interactive schemes –
where the servers can compute their partial signatures without communication with other servers – with
adaptive security (i.e., the adversary corrupts servers dynamically based on its full view of the history
of the system). Our schemes are very efficient in terms of computation, communication, and scalable
storage (with private key shares of size O(1), where certain solutions incur O(n) storage costs at each
server). Unlike other adaptively secure schemes, our schemes are erasure-free (reliable erasure is a hard
to assure and hard to administer property in actual systems). To the best of our knowledge, such a fully
distributed highly constrained scheme has been an open problem in the area. In particular, and of special
interest, is the fact that Pedersen’s traditional distributed key generation (DKG) protocol can be safely
employed in the initial key generation phase when the system is born – although it is well-known not to
ensure uniformly distributed public keys. An advantage of this is that this protocol only takes one round
optimistically (in the absence of faulty player).
Keywords. Threshold signatures, fully distributed schemes, non-interactivity, adaptive security, effi-
ciency, availability, fault tolerance, distributed key generation, erasure-free.
1 Introduction
Threshold cryptography [29, 30, 15, 28] is a paradigm where cryptographic keys are divided into n > 1
shares to be stored by distinct servers, which increases the system’s availability and resilience to
failures. In (t, n)-threshold cryptosystems, private key operations require the cooperation of at least
t+1 out of n servers (any subset is good). By doing so, the system remains secure against adversaries
that break into up to t servers. (The mechanism can be viewed as extending Shamir’s secret sharing
of one value [66] to sharing of the capability to apply cryptographic function efficiently). The public
key portion of the function (e.g., signature verification key) does not change from its usual format.
Threshold primitives are widely used in distributed protocols. Threshold homomorphic encryption
schemes are utilized in voting systems (see, e.g., [22, 23]) and multiparty computation protocols [24].
Threshold signatures enhance the security of highly sensitive private keys, like those of certification
authorities (e.g., [18]). They can also serve as tools for distributed storage systems [48, 64]. RSA and
Elgamal-type constructions have been at the core of many threshold protocols the last two decades
⋆ This work was done while this author was at Technicolor (France).
(see, e.g., [28, 39, 40, 47]). A fully distributed public-key system is one where the public (and the
distributed private) key are jointly generated by the same servers which end up holding the private
key’s shares (e.g., via a threshold secret sharing [66]). Efficient distributed key generation (DKG)
protocols were put forth for both RSA [12, 34, 33, 26] and discrete-logarithm-based systems [61, 41,
35, 16, 43].
Non-Interactive Threshold Signatures. For a long time, RSA-based threshold signatures
have been the only solutions to enable non-interactive distributed signature generation. By “non-
interactive”, we mean that each server can compute its own partial signature without any online
conversation with other servers: each server should send a single message to an entity, called combiner,
which gathers the signature shares so as to obtain a full signature. Unlike threshold versions of
Schnorr and DSA signatures [42, 39], threshold RSA signatures are well-suited to non-interactive
signing protocols as they are deterministic. Hence, they do not require the servers to jointly generate
a randomized signature component in a first round before starting a second round. Practical robust
non-interactive threshold signatures were described by Shoup [67] under the RSA assumption and by
Katz and Yung [50] assuming the hardness of factoring. Boldyreva [10] showed a threshold version
of Boneh-Lynn-Shacham signatures [14], which provided an alternative non-interactive scheme with
robustness and short signatures. The latter construction [10] was subsequently generalized by Wee
[68]. These solutions are only known to resist static attacks, where the set of corrupted servers is
chosen by the adversary at the very beginning of the attack, before even seeing the public key.
Adaptive Corruptions. More realistically than the static model, the adaptive corruption model
allows adversaries to choose whom to corrupt at any time, based on their entire view so far. Adaptive
adversaries are known to be strictly (see, e.g., [25]) stronger. The first adaptively secure threshold
signatures were independently described in 1999 by Canetti et al. [16] and by Frankel et al. [35, 36].
These constructions rely on a technique, called “single inconsistent player” (SIP), which inherently
requires interaction. The SIP technique basically consists in converting a t-out-of-n secret sharing
into an t-out-of-t secret sharing in such a way that, in the latter case, there is only one server whose
internal state cannot be consistently revealed to the adversary. Since this player is chosen at random
by the simulator among the n severs, it is only corrupted with probability less than 1/2 and, upon
this undesirable event, the simulator can simply rewind the adversary back to one of its previous
states. After this backtracking operation, the simulator uses different random coins to simulate the
view of the adversary, hoping that the inconsistent player will not be corrupted again (and the ex-
pected number of rewinding-s is bounded by 2).
Jarecki and Lysyanskaya [49] extended the SIP technique to eliminate the need for servers to reli-
ably erase intermediate computation results. However, their adaptively secure version of the Canetti-
Goldwasser threshold cryptosystem [17] requires a substantial amount of interaction at each private
key operation. The same holds for the adaptively secure threshold signatures of Lysyanskaya and
Peikert [56] and the universally composable protocols of Abe and Fehr [1].
In 2006, Almansa, Damg˚ard and Nielsen [4] showed a variant of Rabin’s threshold RSA signatures
[63] and proved them adaptively secure using the SIP technique and ideas from [35, 36]. Similar tech-
niques were used in [69] to construct adaptively secure threshold Waters signatures [70]. While the
SIP technique provides adaptively secure threshold signatures based on RSA or the Diffie-Hellman
assumption, these fall short of minimizing the amount of interaction. The constructions of [35, 36]
proceed by turning a (t, n) polynomial secret sharing into a (t, t) additive secret sharing by first
selecting a pool of at least t participants. However, if only one of these fails to provide a valid con-
tribution to the signing process, the whole protocol must be restarted from scratch. The protocol of
Almansa et al. [4] is slightly different in that, like [63], it proceeds by sharing an RSA private key
in an additive (n, n) fashion (i.e., the private RSA exponent d is split into shares d1, . . . , dn such
that d =
∑n
i=1 di). In turn, each additive share di is shared in a (t, n) fashion using a polynomial
verifiable secret sharing and each share di,j of di is distributed to another server j. This is done in
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such a way that, if one participant fails to provide a valid RSA signature share H(M)di , the miss-
ing signature share can be re-constructed by running the reconstruction algorithm of the verifiable
secret sharing scheme that was used to share di. The first drawback of this approach is that it is
only non-interactive when all players are honest as a second round is needed to reconstruct missing
multiplicative signature shares H(M)di . Another disadvantage is that players have to store Θ(n)
values, where n is the number of servers, as each player has to store a polynomial share of other
players’ additive share. Ideally, we would like a solution where each player only stores O(1) elements,
regardless of the number of players.
Recently, Libert and Yung [54, 55] gave several constructions of adaptively secure threshold en-
cryption schemes with chosen-ciphertext security. They also suggested an adaptively secure and
non-interactive threshold variant [54] of a signature scheme due to Lewko and Waters [51]. The use
of bilinear maps in composite order groups makes the scheme of [54] expensive when it comes to
verifying signatures: as discussed by Freeman [38], computing a bilinear map in composite order
groups is at least 50 times slower than evaluating the same bilinear map in prime order groups
at the 80-bit security level (things can only get worse at higher security levels). The techniques
of Lewko [52] can be used to adapt the construction of [54] to the setting of prime-order groups.
In the resulting construction, each signature consists of 6 group elements. The use of asymmetric
bilinear maps (see [19]) allows reducing the signature size to 4 group elements. Unfortunately, the
techniques of [52, 19] assume a trusted dealer and, if implemented in a distributed manner, their
key generation phase is likely to be communication-expensive (resorting to generic multiparty secure
computations). In particular, they seem hardly compatible with a round-optimal DKG protocol. The
reason is that [19] requires to generate public keys containing pairs of matrices of the form gA ∈ Gn×n
and gA
−1
∈ Gn×n, for some matrix A ∈ Zn×np , and it is not clear how these non-linear operations
can be achieved in a round-optimal distributed manner (let alone with adaptive security). Finally,
the solutions of [54] require reliable erasures due to the use of the dual system encryption technique
[71, 51] and the existence of several distributions of partial signatures.
Our Contributions. We consider the problem of devising a fully distributed, non-interactive, ro-
bust, and adaptively secure construction which is as efficient as the centralized schemes obtained
from [54, 19] and does not rely on erasures. In particular, we want to retain private key shares of
O(1) size, no matter how many players are involved in the protocol. Here, “fully distributed” im-
plies that the public key is jointly generated by all players – so that no trusted dealer is needed –
while guaranteeing the security of the scheme against an adaptive adversary. As mentioned above,
we wish to avoid the costly and hard-to-control use of reliable erasures. This means that, whenever
the adversary corrupts a player, it learns the entire history of that player.
At the same time, the distributed key generation phase should be as communication-efficient as
possible. Ideally, a single communication round should be needed when the players follow the proto-
col. Finally, we would like to avoid interaction during the distributed signing process. To the best of
our knowledge, no existing solution combines all the aforementioned highly constraining properties.
We thus provide the first candidates.
Our constructions are derived from linearly homomorphic structure-preserving signatures (LH-
SPS). As defined by Abe et al. [2, 3], structure-preserving signatures (SPS) are signature schemes
where messages and public keys live in an abelian group over which a bilinear map is efficiently com-
putable. Recently, Libert et al. [53] considered SPS schemes with additive homomorphic properties:
given signatures on linearly independent vectors of group elements, anyone can publicly compute a
signature on any linear combination of these vectors. In order to sign a message M ∈ {0, 1}∗ in a
distributed manner, our idea is to hash M onto a vector of group elements which is signed using the
LHSPS scheme of [53]. In the random oracle model, we prove that the resulting system is a secure
digital signature even if the underlying LHSPS scheme satisfies a weak security definition. Since
the LHSPS signing algorithm is deterministic and further presents certain homomorphic properties
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over the key space, the resulting signature is also amenable for non-interactive distributed signature
generation. In the threshold setting, we take advantage of specific properties of the LHSPS scheme of
[53] to prove that the scheme provides security against adaptive corruptions in the absence of secure
erasures.
More surprisingly, we prove that the scheme remains adaptively secure if the public key is gener-
ated using Pedersen’s DKG protocol [61]. The latter basically consists in having all players verifiably
share a random value using Feldman’s verifiable secret sharing (VSS) [32] before computing the
shared secret as the sum of all well-behaved players’ contributions. While very efficient (as only one
round is needed in the absence of faulty players), this protocol is known [41] not to guarantee the
uniformity of the resulting public key. Indeed, even a static adversary can bias the distribution by
corrupting only two players. Nonetheless, the adversary does not have much control on the distribu-
tion of the public key and Pedersen’s protocol can still be safely used in some applications, as noted
by Gennaro et al. [42, 43]. For example, it was recently utilized by Cortier et al. [21] in the context
of voting protocols. However, these safe uses of Pedersen’s protocol were in the static corruption
setting and our scheme turns out to be its first application in an adaptive corruption model. To our
knowledge, it is also the first adaptively secure threshold signature where the DKG phase takes only
one round when all players follow the specification.
As an extension of our first scheme, we describe a variant supporting signature aggregation: as
suggested by Boneh et al. [13], a set of n signatures for distinct public keys PK1, . . . , PKs on mes-
sages M1, . . . ,Ms can be aggregated into a single signature σ which convinces a verifier that, for
each i, Mi was signing by the private key underlying PKi. In the threshold setting, this property al-
lows for de-centralized certification authorities while enabling the compression of certification chains.
As a final contribution, we give a non-interactive adaptively secure threshold signature scheme in
the standard model that retains all the useful properties (including the erasure-freeness) of our first
realization. In particular, Pedersen’s protocol can still be used in the key generation phase if a set of
uniformly random common parameters – which can be shared by many public keys – is set up be-
forehand. As is natural for standard-model constructions, this scheme is somewhat less efficient than
its random-oracle-based counterpart but it remains sufficiently efficient for practical applications.
Like Gennaro et al. [43] and Cortier et al. [21], we prove security via a direct reduction from
the underlying number theoretic assumption instead of reducing the security of our schemes to that
of their centralized version. We emphasize that our proof technique is different from those of [43,
21], where the reduction runs Pedersen’s DKG protocol on behalf of honest players and embeds a
discrete logarithm instance in the contribution of honest players to the public key, using a proper
simulation of Feldman’s verifiable secret sharing. In the adaptive corruption setting, this would at
least require an adaptively secure variant of Feldman’s VSS, such as [1], and thus extra communi-
cations. Instead, our reduction always faithfully runs the protocol on behalf of honest players, and
thus always knows their internal state so as to perfectly answer corruption queries. Yet, we can use
the adversary’s forgery to break the underlying hardness assumption by taking advantage of key
homomorphic properties of the scheme, which allow us to turn a forgery for the jointly generated
public key – of possibly skewed distribution – into a forgery for some uniformly random key.
2 Background
2.1 Definitions for Threshold Signatures
A non-interactive (t, n)-threshold signature scheme consists of a tuple Σ = (Dist-Keygen, Share-Sign,
Share-Verify,Verify,Combine) of efficient algorithms or protocols such that:
Dist-Keygen(params, λ, t, n): This is an interactive protocol involving n players P1, . . . , Pn, which
all take as input common public parameters params, a security parameter λ ∈ N as well as a pair
of integers t, n ∈ poly(λ) such that 1 ≤ t ≤ n. The outcome of the protocol is the generation of a
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public key PK, a vector of private key shares SK = (SK1, . . . , SKn) where Pi only obtains SKi
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and a public vector of verification keys VK = (V K1, . . . , V Kn).
Share-Sign(SKi,M): is a possibly randomized algorithm that takes in a message M and a private
key share SKi. It outputs a signature share σi.
Share-Verify(PK,VK,M, (i, σi)): is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a messageM , the
public key PK, the verification key VK and a pair (i, σi) consisting of an index i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and signature share σi. It outputs 1 or 0 depending on whether σi is deemed as a valid signature
share or not.
Combine(PK,VK,M, {(i, σi)}i∈S): takes as input a public key PK, a message M and a subset
S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of size |S| = t + 1 with pairs {(i, σi)}i∈S such that i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and σi is a
signature share. This algorithm outputs either a full signature σ or ⊥ if {(i, σi)}i∈S contains
ill-formed partial signatures.
Verify(PK,M, σ): is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a message M , the public key PK
and a signature σ. It outputs 1 or 0 depending on whether σ is deemed valid share or not.
We shall use the same communication model as in, e.g., [41–43], which is partially synchronous.
Namely, communications proceed in synchronized rounds and sent messages are always received
within some time bound in the same round. All players have access to a public broadcast channel,
which the adversary can use as a sender and a receiver. However, the adversary cannot modify
messages sent over this channel, nor prevent their delivery. In addition, we assume private and
authenticated channels between all pairs of players.
In the adaptive corruption setting, the security of non-interactive threshold signatures can be
defined as follows.
Definition 1. A non-interactive threshold signature scheme Σ is adaptively secure against chosen-
message attacks if no PPT adversary A has non-negligible advantage in the game hereunder. At
any time, we denote by C ⊂ {1, . . . , n} and G := {1, . . . , n}\C the dynamically evolving subsets of
corrupted and honest players, respectively. Initially, we set C = ∅.
1. The game begins with an execution of Dist-Keygen(params, λ, t,N) during which the challenger
plays the role of honest players Pi and the adversary A is allowed to corrupt players at any
time. When A chooses to corrupt a player Pi, the challenger sets G = G\{i}, C = C ∪ {i} and
returns the internal state of Pi. Moreover, A is allowed to act on behalf of Pi from this point
forward. The protocol ends with the generation of a public key PK, a vector of private key shares
SK = (SK1, . . . , SKn) and the corresponding verification keys VK = (V K1, . . . , V Kn). At the
end of this phase, the public key PK and {SKi}i∈C are available to the adversary A.
2. On polynomially many occasions, A adaptively interleaves two kinds of queries.
- Corruption query: At any time, A can choose to corrupt a server. To this end, A chooses
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and the challenge returns SKi before setting G = G\{i} and C = C ∪ {i}.
- Signing query: For any i ∈ G, A can also submit a pair (i,M) and ask for a signature share
on an arbitrary message M on behalf of player Pi. The challenger responds by computing
σi ← Share-Sign(SKi,M) and returning σ to A.
3. A outputs a message M⋆ and a signature σ⋆. We define V = C ∪ S, where S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} is the
subset of players for which A made a signing query of the form (i,M⋆). The adversary wins if
the following conditions hold: (i) |V| < t+ 1; (ii) Verify(PK,M⋆, σ⋆) = 1.
A’s advantage is defined as its probability of success, taken over all coin tosses.
Since we focus on non-interactive schemes, Definition 1 allows the adversary to individually query
each partial signing oracle whereas usual definitions only provide the adversary with an oracle that
runs the distributed signing protocol on behalf of all honest players. We also remark that Definition 1
allows the adversary to obtain some partial signatures on the forgery messageM⋆ as long as its output
remains a non-trivial forgery. In a weaker (but still compelling) definition, partial signing queries for
M⋆ would be completely disallowed. In the following, we will stick to the stronger definition.
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2.2 Hardness Assumptions
We first recall the definition of the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem.
Definition 2. In a cyclic group G of prime order p, the Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem
(DDH) in G, is to distinguish the distributions (g, ga, gb, gab) and (g, ga, gb, gc), with a, b, c R← Zp.
The Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption is the intractability of DDH for any PPT distinguisher.
We use bilinear maps e : G× Gˆ→ GT over groups of prime order p. We will work in asymmetric
pairings, where we have G 6= Gˆ so as to allow the DDH assumption to hold in G (see, e.g., [65]).
In certain asymmetric pairing configurations, DDH is even believed to hold in both G and Gˆ. This
assumption is called Symmetric eXternal Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption and it implies that no
isomorphism between Gˆ and G be efficiently computable.
For convenience, we also use the following problem in asymmetric pairing configurations.
Definition 3 ([3]). The Double Pairing problem (DP) in (G, Gˆ,GT ) is, given (gˆz, gˆr) ∈R Gˆ
2,
to find a non-trivial (z, r) ∈ G2\{(1G, 1G)} that satisfies e(z, gˆz) · e(r, gˆr) = 1GT . The Double Pairing
assumption asserts that the DP problem is infeasible for any PPT algorithm.
The DP problem is known [3] to be at least as hard as DDH in Gˆ. Given (gˆz, gˆr, gˆz
θ1 , gˆr
θ2), a
solution (z, r) allows deciding whether θ1 = θ2 or not by testing if e(z, gˆz
θ1) · e(r, gˆr
θ2) = 1GT .
2.3 Linearly Homomorphic Structure-Preserving Signatures
Structure-preserving signatures [2, 3] are signature schemes that allow signing elements of an abelian
group while preserving their algebraic structure, without hashing them first. In [53], Libert et al.
described structure-preserving signatures with linearly homomorphic properties. Given signatures
on several vectors M1, . . . ,Mn of group elements, anyone can publicly derive a signature on any
linear combination ofM1, . . . ,Mn. They suggested the following scheme, which is a one-time LHSPS
(namely, it only allows signing one linear subspace) based on the DP assumption.
Keygen(λ,N): Given a security parameter λ and the dimension N ∈ N of the subspace to be signed,
choose bilinear group (G, Gˆ,GT ) of prime order p > 2
λ. Then, conduct the following steps.
1. Choose gˆz, gˆr
R← Gˆ.
2. For k = 1 to N , pick χk, γk
R← Zp and compute gˆk = gˆz
χk gˆr
γk .
The private key is sk = {χk, γk}
N
i=1 while the public key consists of pk =
(
gˆz, gˆr, {gˆk}
N
k=1
)
.
Sign(sk, (M1, . . . ,MN)): To sign a vector (M1, . . . ,MN ) ∈ G
N using sk = {χk, γk}
N
k=1, compute
and output σ = (z, r) ∈ G2, where z =
∏N
k=1M
−χk
k , r =
∏N
k=1M
−γk
k .
SignDerive(pk, {(ωi, σ
(i))}ℓi=1): Given pk and ℓ tuples (ωi, σ
(i)), parse σ(i) as σ(i) =
(
zi, ri
)
∈ G3
for i = 1 to ℓ. Then, compute and return σ = (z, r), where z =
∏ℓ
i=1 z
ωi
i and r =
∏ℓ
i=1 r
ωi
i .
Verify(pk, σ, (M1, . . . ,MN)): Given σ = (z, r) ∈ G
2 and a vector (M1, . . . ,MN ), return 1 if and
only if (M1, . . . ,MN ) 6= (1G, . . . , 1G) and (z, r) satisfies 1GT = e(z, gˆz) · e(r, gˆr) ·
∏N
k=1 e(Mk, gˆk).
A useful property of the scheme is that, if the DP assumption holds, it is computationally hard to
come up with two distinct signatures on the same vector, even if the private key is available.
3 A Practical Adaptively Secure Non-Interactive Threshold Signature
The construction notably relies on the observation that, as shown in Appendix D.1, any one-time
linearly homomorphic SPS can be turned into a fully secure ordinary signature by introducing a
random oracle. The public key is simply that of a linearly homomorphic SPS for vectors of dimension
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n > 1. Messages are signed by hashing them to a vector H ∈ Gn and generating a one-time
homomorphic signature on H. The security reduction programs the random oracle in such a way
that all signed messages are hashed into a proper subspace of Gn whereas, with some probability, the
adversary forges a signature on a message which is hashed outside this subspace. Hence, a forgery
for this message translates into an attack against the underlying linearly homomorphic SPS.
In the threshold setting, our system can be seen as an adaptively secure variant of Boldyreva’s
threshold signature [10], which builds on the short signatures of Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham [14].
The DKG phase uses Pedersen’s protocol [61] (or, more precisely, a variant with two generators).
Each player verifiably shares a random secret using Pedersen’s verifiable secret sharing [62] – where
verification is enabled by having all parties broadcast commitments to their secret polynomials –
and the final secret key is obtained by summing up the shares of non-disqualified players. When all
parties follow the protocol, a single communication round is needed. Moreover, we do not need to
rely on zero-knowledge proofs or reliable erasures at any time.
In order to sign a message using his private key share, each player first hashes the message M
to obtain a vector (H1, H2) ∈ G
2 of two group elements, which can be signed using the linearly
homomorphic structure-preserving signature of Section 2.3. We actually build on the observation
that any one-time linearly homomorphic SPS implies a fully secure digital signature in the random
oracle model. In the threshold setting, we take advantage of two specific properties in the underlying
homomorphic signature. First, it is also key homomorphic4 and thus amenable for non-interactively
distributing the signing process. Second, in the security proof of [53], the reduction always knows
the private key, which allows consistently answering adaptive corruption queries.
3.1 Description
In the description below, we assume that all players agree on public parameters params consisting
of asymmetric bilinear groups (G, Gˆ,GT ) of prime order p > 2
λ with generators gˆz, gˆr ∈R Gˆ and a
hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G2 that ranges over G×G. This hash function is modeled as a random
oracle in the security analysis. While no party should know loggˆz(gˆr), we do not need an extra round
to generate gˆr in a distributed manner as it can simply be derived from a random oracle.
Dist-Keygen(params, λ, t, n): Given params = {(G, Gˆ,GT ), gˆz, gˆr, H}, a security parameter λ and
integers t, n ∈ N such that n ≥ 2t+ 1, each player Pi conducts the following steps.
1. Each player Pi shares two random pairs {(aik0, bik0)}
2
k=1. To this end, he does the following:
a. For each k ∈ {1, 2}, choose random polynomials Aik[X] = aik0 + aik1X + · · · + aiktX
t,
Bik[X] = bik0 + bik1X + · · ·+ biktX
t ∈ Zp[X] of degree t and broadcast
Wˆikℓ = gˆz
aikℓ gˆr
bikℓ ∀ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , t}
b. For j = 1 to n, send {(Aik(j), Bik(j))}
2
k=1 to Pj .
2. For each set of shares {(Ajk(i), Bjk(i))}
2
k=1 received from another player Pj , Pi verifies that
gˆ
Ajk(i)
z gˆ
Bjk(i)
r =
t∏
ℓ=0
Wˆ i
ℓ
jkℓ for k = 1, 2. (1)
If these equalities do not both hold, Pi broadcasts a complaint against the faulty sender Pj .
3. Any player who receives strictly more than t complaints is immediately disqualified. Each
player Pi who received a complaint from another player Pj responds by returning the correct
shares {(Aik(j), Bik(j))}
2
k=1. If any of these new shares does not satisfy (1), Pi is disqualified.
Let Q ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be the set of non-disqualified players at the end of step 3.
4 Namely, the private key space forms an additive group such that, for any message M , given any two signatures
σ1 ← Sign(sk1,M) and σ2 ← Sign(sk2,M), anyone can compute a valid signature onM for the private key sk1+sk2.
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4. The public key is obtained as PK = {gˆk}
2
k=1, where gˆk =
∏
i∈Q Wˆik0 = gˆ
∑
i∈Q aik0
z gˆ
∑
i∈Q bik0
r .
Each Pi locally defines his private key share
SKi = {(Ak(i), Bk(i))}
2
k=1 = {
(∑
j∈Q
Ajk(i),
∑
j∈Q
Bjk(i)
)
}2k=1
and anyone can publicly compute his verification key V Ki =
(
Vˆ1,i, Vˆ2,i
)
as
V Ki =
(
gˆz
A1(i)gˆr
B1(i), gˆz
A2(i)gˆr
B2(i)
)
=
(∏
j∈Q
t∏
ℓ=0
Wˆ i
ℓ
j1ℓ,
∏
j∈Q
t∏
ℓ=0
Wˆ i
ℓ
j2ℓ
)
.
For any disqualified player i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\Q, the i-th private key share is implicitly set as
SKi = {(0, 0)}
2
k=1 and the corresponding verification key is V Ki = (1Gˆ, 1Gˆ).
This completes the generation of the private key shares SK = (SK1, . . . , SKn), the vector of
verification keys VK = (V K1, . . . , V Kn) and the public key, which consists of
PK =
(
params,
(
gˆ1, gˆ2
))
.
When the protocol ends, the private key shares {Ak(i)}
2
k=1 and {Bk(i)}
2
k=1 lie on t-degree polyno-
mials Ak[X] =
∑
j∈QAjk[X] and Bk[X] =
∑
j∈QBjk[X]. Each player also holds an additive share
{(aik0, bik0)}
2
k=1 of the secret key {(Ak(0), Bk(0)) = (
∑
i∈Q aik0,
∑
i∈Q bik0)}
2
k=1 but these shares will
not be used in the scheme.
Share-Sign(i, SKi,M): To generate a partial signature on a message M ∈ {0, 1}
∗ using his private
key share SKi = {(Ak(i), Bk(i))}
2
k=1, Pi first computes the hash value (H1, H2) = H(M) ∈ G×G
and generates the partial signature σi = (zi, ri) ∈ G
2 as
zi =
2∏
k=1
H
−Ak(i)
k ri =
2∏
k=1
H
−Bk(i)
k .
Share-Verify
(
PK,VK,M, (i, σi)
)
: Given the partial signature σi = (zi, ri) ∈ G
2 and the verification
key V Ki =
(
Vˆ1,i, Vˆ2,i
)
, the algorithm first computes (H1, H2) = H(M) ∈ G
2. It returns 1 if
e(zi, gˆz) · e(ri, gˆr) ·
∏2
k=1 e(Hk, Vˆk,i) = 1GT and 0 otherwise.
Combine(PK,VK,M, {(i, σi)}i∈S): Given a (t+1)-set with valid shares {(i, σi)}i∈S , parse the signa-
ture share σi as
(
zi, ri
)
∈ G2 for each i ∈ S. Then, compute (z, r) =
(∏
i∈S z
∆i,S(0)
i ,
∏
i∈S r
∆i,S(0)
i
)
by Lagrange interpolation in the exponent. Return the pair (z, r) ∈ G2.
Verify
(
PK,M, σ
)
: Given a purported signature σ = (z, r) ∈ G2, compute (H1, H2) = H(M) ∈ G×G
and return 1 if and only if the following equality holds:
e(z, gˆz) · e(r, gˆr) · e(H1, gˆ1) · e(H2, gˆ2) = 1GT .
If the scheme is instantiated using Barreto-Naehrig curves [5] at the 128-bit security level, each
signature consists of 512 bits. For the same security level, RSA-based threshold signatures like [67,
4] require 3076 bits. The scheme is also very efficient from a computational standpoint. Each server
only has to compute two multi-exponentiations with two base elements and two “hash-on-curve”
operations. The verifier has to compute a product of four pairings.
At the end of the key generation phase, each player only needs to store a constant-size private
key share SKi = {(Ak(i), Bk(i))}
2
k=1 – whereas solutions like [4] incur the storage of O(n) elements
at each player – and can erase all intermediate values, including the polynomials Aik[X] and Bik[X].
However, we insist that the security analysis does not require reliable erasures. When a player is
corrupted, we assume that the adversary learns the entire history of this player.
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3.2 Security
Although the public key is not guaranteed to be uniform due to the use of Pedersen’s DKG protocol,
the key homomorphic property allows the reduction to turn the adversary’s forgery into a valid
signature with respect to some uniformly random public key obtained by multiplying honest users’
contributions to the public key. This is sufficient for solving a given Double Pairing instance.
Theorem 1. The scheme provides adaptive security under the SXDH assumption in the random
oracle model. Namely, for any PPT adversary A, there exist DDH distinguishers B1 and B2 with
comparable running time in the groups G and Gˆ, respectively.
A detailed proof of Theorem 1 is available in Appendix B. It proceeds with a sequence of games
which can be outlined as follows.
The first game is the real game where the challenger assumes the role of all honest players in the
distributed key generation phase. Since it controls a majority of players, the challenger knows the
polynomials {Ajk[X], Bjk[X]}j∈Q,k∈{1,2} and the private key shares {SKj}j∈Q of all non-disqualified
players – either because it obtained at least t+ 1 polynomial shares {(Ajk(i), Bjk(i))}i∈G,k∈{1,2} for
each j ∈ Q or because it chose the polynomials itself – at the end of the Dist-Keygen protocol.
In subsequent games, the challenger applies Coron’s proof technique for Full Domain Hash sig-
natures [20]. At each random oracle query H(M), it flips a coin ϑM ∈ {0, 1} that takes the value
0 with probability 1/qs and the value 1 with probability 1/(qs + 1), where qs is the number of
signing queries. If ϑM = 1, the challenger defines H(M) to be a random vector of G
2. If ϑM = 0,
the message M is hashed to a subspace of dimension 1. We prove that, although H does no longer
behave as an actual random oracle, this change should not affect the adversary’s view if the DDH
assumption holds in G. Coron’s analysis [20] shows that, with probability Ω(1/qs), the following con-
ditions are fulfilled: (i) The adversary only obtains partial signatures on messages M1, . . . ,Mqs that
are hashed in a one-dimensional subspace; (ii) The adversary’s forgery involves a message M⋆ such
that (H⋆1 , H
⋆
2 ) = H(M
⋆) is linearly independent of the vectors {(H1,i, H2,i) = H(Mi)}
qs
i=1. Condi-
tion (i) ensures that the adversary obtains little information about the private key shares {SKi}i∈G
and the additive shares {aik0, bik0}i∈G,k∈{1,2} of honest players. Hence, if the challenger computes
the additive contribution of honest players to a signature on the vector (H⋆1 , H
⋆
2 ) = H(M
⋆), this
contribution is completely unpredictable by the adversary due to condition (ii). With overwhelming
probability, this contribution does not coincide with the one that can be extracted (using the additive
shares {ajk0, bjk0}j∈Q\G, k∈{1,2} that the reduction knows from the key generation phase) from the
adversary’s forgery (z⋆, r⋆) using the key homomorphic property of the scheme. The challenger thus
obtains two distinct linearly homomorphic signatures on the vector (H⋆1 , H
⋆
2 ), which allows solving
an instance of the Double Pairing problem.
The proof of Theorem 1 goes through if, during the key generation phase, each player Pi ad-
ditionally publicizes (Zi0, Ri0) =
(
g−ai10h−ai20 , g−bi10h−bi20
)
, for public g, h ∈ G, which satisfies
e(Zi0, gˆz) · e(Ri0, gˆr) · e(h, Wˆi10) · e(g, Wˆi20) = 1GT and thus forms a LHSPS on (g, h) for the public
key {Wˆik0}
2
k=1. Based on this observation, we describe a simple modification of the scheme that
supports signature aggregation in Appendix G.
3.3 Adding Proactive Security
The scheme readily extends to provide proactive security [60, 47, 37] against mobile adversaries that
can potentially corrupt all the players at some point as long as it never controls more than t players
at any time. By having the players refreshing all shares (without changing the secret) at discrete
time intervals, the scheme remains secure against an adversary corrupting up to t players during the
same period. This is achieved by having all players run a new instance of Pedersen’s DKG protocol
where the shared secret is {(0, 0)}2k=1 and locally add the resulting shares to their local shares before
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updating {V Ki}
n
i=1 accordingly.
The techniques of [46, Section 4] can also be applied to detect parties holding a corrupted share
(due to a crash during an update phase or an adversarial behavior) and restore the correct share.
4 A Construction in the Standard Model
This section gives a round-optimal construction in the standard model. We remark that, under the
Decision Linear assumption [11], any one-time LHSPS in symmetric bilinear groups can be turned
into a full-fledged digital signature, as shown in Appendix D.2. In the threshold setting, we need to
rely on specific properties of the underlying LHSPS in order to achieve adaptive security without
relying on a trusted dealer.
The scheme relies on the Groth-Sahai non-interactive witness indistinguishable (NIWI) proof
systems [45], which are recalled in Appendix A. In its centralized version, a signature consists of
a NIWI proof of knowledge – somewhat in the spirit of Okamoto’s signature scheme [59] – of a
one-time linearly homomorphic signature on a fixed vector g ∈ G of dimension n = 1. To generate
this proof, the signer forms a Groth-Sahai [45] common reference string (CRS) (f ,fM ) using the
bits of the message M , according to a technique suggested by Malkin et al. [57]. Due to the witness
indistinguishability property of Groth-Sahai proofs, no information leaks about the private key of
the underlying one-time homomorphic signature. For this reason, when the adversary creates a fake
signature, the reduction is able to extract a different homomorphic signature than the one it can
compute on its own. Hence, it obtains two distinct signatures on the same vector, which allows
solving an instance of the DP problem.
The scheme can also be seen as a threshold version of (a variant of) the signature scheme presented
in [57]. In order to distribute the signing process, we take advantage of the homomorphic properties
of Groth-Sahai proofs. More precisely, we use the fact that linear pairing product equations and
their proofs can be linearly combined in order to obtain a valid proof for the desired statement when
performing a Lagrange interpolation in the exponent. In order to avoid interaction during the signing
process, we leverage the property that the centralized signature scheme is key homomorphic.
However, we have to prove that the scheme remains adaptively secure when the DKG phase uses
Pedersen’s protocol [61]. To this end, we take further advantage of the key homomorphic property. In
the security proof, we show that, if the adversary can forge a signature for a non-uniform public key
PK, we can turn this forgery into one for another public key PK ′, which is uniformly distributed.
In the following notations, for each h ∈ G and any vector g = (g1, g2) ∈ G
2, we denote by E(g, hˆ)
the vector (e(g1, hˆ), e(g2, gˆ)) ∈ G
2
T .
This time, we assume public parameters params consisting of asymmetric bilinear groups (G, Gˆ,GT )
of prime order p > 2λ with generators g ∈R G, gˆz, gˆr ∈R Gˆ as well as vectors f = (f, h) ∈ G
2 and
f i = (fi, hi)
R← G2 for i = 0 to L, where L ∈ poly(λ).
Dist-Keygen(params, λ, t, n): This protocol proceeds as in the scheme of Section 3. Namely, given
params = {(G, Gˆ,GT ), g, gˆz, gˆr,f , {f i}
L
i=0}, a security parameter λ and integers t, n ∈ N such
that n ≥ 2t+ 1, each player Pi conducts the following steps.
1. Each player Pi shares a random pair (ai0, bi0) according to the following step:
a. Pick random polynomials Ai[X] = ai0+ai1X+ · · ·+aitX
t, Bi[X] = bi0+bi1X+ · · ·+bitX
t
of degree t and broadcast Wˆiℓ = gˆz
aiℓ gˆr
biℓ for all ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , t}.
b. For j = 1 to n, send (Ai(j), Bi(j)) to Pj .
2. For each received shares (Aj(i), Bj(i)), player Pi verifies that
gˆ
Aj(i)
z gˆ
Bj(i)
r =
t∏
ℓ=0
Wˆ i
ℓ
jℓ . (2)
If the latter equality does not hold, Pi broadcasts a complaint against Pj .
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3. Any player receiving more than t complaints is disqualified. Each player Pi who received a
complaint from another player Pj responds by returning the correct shares (Ai(j), Bi(j)). If
any of these new shares fails to satisfy (2), the faulty Pi is expelled. Let Q ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be
the set of non-disqualified players at the end of step 3.
4. The public key PK is obtained as PK = gˆ1, where gˆ1 =
∏
i∈Q Wˆi0 = gˆ
∑
i∈Q ai0
z gˆ
∑
i∈Q bi0
r . Each
Pi locally defines his private key share SKi = (A(i), B(i)) =
(∑
j∈QAj(i),
∑
j∈QBj(i)
)
and
anyone can publicly compute his verification key as V Ki = Vˆi = gˆz
A(i)gˆr
B(i) =
∏
j∈Q
∏t
ℓ=0 Wˆ
iℓ
jℓ .
Any disqualified player i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\Q is implicitly assigned the share SKi = (0, 0) and the
matching verification key V Ki = 1Gˆ.
The vector of private key shares is SK = (SK1, . . . , SKn) and the corresponding vector of
verification keys VK = (V K1, . . . , V Kn). The public key consists of PK =
(
params, gˆ1
)
.
Share-Sign(SKi,M): To generate a partial signature on a message M = M [1] . . .M [L] ∈ {0, 1}
L
using SKi = (A(i), B(i)), define (zi, ri) = (g
−A(i), g−B(i)) and do the following.
1. Using the bits M [1] . . .M [L] of M ∈ {0, 1}L, define the vector fM = f0 ·
∏L
i=1 f
M [i]
i so as to
assemble a Groth-Sahai CRS fM = (f ,fM ).
2. Using the CRS fM = (f ,fM ), compute Groth-Sahai commitments Cz,i = (1G, zi) ·f
νz,1
1 ·f
νz,2
M
and Cr,i = (1G, ri)·f
νr,1,i ·f
νr,2,i
M to the group elements zi and ri, respectively. Then, generate a
NIWI proof pˆii = (πˆ1,i, πˆ2,i) ∈ Gˆ
2 that committed elements (zi, ri) ∈ G
2 satisfy the verification
equation 1GT = e(zi, gˆz) · e(ri, gˆr) · e(g, Vˆi). This proof is obtained as
pˆii = (πˆ1,i, πˆ2,i) =
(
gˆz
−νz,1,i · gˆr
−νr,1,i , gˆz
−νz,2,i · gˆr
−νr,2,i
)
Return the partial signature σi = (Cz,i,Cr,i, pˆii) ∈ G
4 × Gˆ2.
Share-Verify(PK,VK,M, (i, σi)): Given M =M [1] . . .M [L] ∈ {0, 1}
L and a candidate σi, parse σi
as σi = (Cz,i,Cr,i, pˆii). Define fM = f0 ·
∏L
i=1 f
M [i]
i . Return 1 if pˆii = (πˆ1,i, πˆ2,i) satisfies
E
(
(1G, g), Vˆi
)−1
= E
(
Cz,i, gˆz
)
· E
(
Cr,i, gˆr
)
· E(f , πˆ1,i) · E(fM , πˆ2,i)
and 0 otherwise.
Combine(PK,VK,M, {(i, σi)}i∈S): Given a (t + 1)-set with valid shares {(i, σi)}i∈S , parse each
share σi as (Cz,i,Cr,i, pˆii) ∈ G
4 × Gˆ2, where pˆii = (πˆ1,i, πˆ2,i), for all i ∈ S. Then, compute
(C ′z,C
′
r, πˆ
′
1, πˆ
′
2) =
(∏
i∈S
C
∆i,S(0)
z,i ,
∏
i∈S
C
∆i,S(0)
r,i ,
∏
i∈S
πˆ
∆i,S(0)
1,i ,
∏
i∈S
πˆ
∆i,S(0)
2,i
)
by Lagrange interpolation in the exponent. Then, re-randomize (C ′z,C
′
r, πˆ
′
1, πˆ
′
2) and output the
resulting re-randomized full signature σ = (Cz,Cr, πˆ1, πˆ2).
Verify(PK,M, σ): Given a messageM =M [1] . . .M [L] ∈ {0, 1}L and a purported signature σ, parse
σ as (Cz,Cr, pˆi) ∈ G
4× Gˆ2. Define fM = f0 ·
∏L
i=1 f
M [i]
i and return 1 if and only if pˆi = (πˆ1, πˆ2)
satisfies
E
(
(1G, g), gˆ1
)−1
= E
(
Cz, gˆz
)
· E
(
Cr, gˆr
)
· E(f , πˆ1) · E(fM , πˆ2).
We remark that the scheme can be simplified by having each player set his private key share as
SKi = (g
−A(i), g−B(i)) so as to spare two exponentiations in the signing phase. In the description, we
defined SKi as (A(i), B(i)) to insist that no reliable erasures are needed. At each corruption query,
the adversary obtains (A(i), B(i)) and, not only (g−A(i), g−B(i)). In any case, each player only needs
to store two elements of Zp.
At the 128-bit security level, if each element of G (resp. Gˆ) has a 256-bit (resp. 512 bit) repre-
sentation on Barreto-Naehrig curves [5], we only need 2048 bits per signature.
Theorem 2. The scheme provides adaptive security under the SXDH assumption in the standard
model. Namely, for any PPT adversary A, there exist DDH distinguishers B1 and B2 with comparable
running time in the groups G and Gˆ, respectively. (The proof is available in Appendix H).
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A Groth-Sahai Non-Interactive Proof Systems
In [45], Groth and Sahai described efficient non-interactive witness indistinguishable (NIWI) proof
systems of which one instantiation relies on the SXDH assumption. This instantiation uses prime
order groups and a common reference string containing three vectors f1,f2 ∈ G
2, where f1 = (g, f1),
f2 = (h, f2), for some g, h, f1, f2 ∈ G. To commit to a group element X ∈ G, the prover chooses
r, s R← Zp and computes C = (1, X) · f1
r · f2
s. On a perfectly sound common reference string,
we have f2 = f1
ξ, for some ξ ∈ Zp. Commitments C = (g
r+ξs, f r+ξs1 · X) are extractable as their
distribution coincides with that of an Elgamal ciphertexts [31] and the committed X can be extracted
using β = logg(f1). In the witness indistinguishability (WI) setting, the vector f2 is chosen so that
(f1,f2) are linearly independent vectors and C is a perfectly hiding commitment. Under the DDH
assumption in G, the two kinds of CRS can be exchanged for one another without the adversary
noticing.
To convince the verifier that committed variables satisfy a set of relations, the prover computes
one commitment per variable and one proof element per equation. Such NIWI proofs can be efficiently
generated for linear pairing-product equations, which are relations of the type
n∏
i=1
e(Xi,Ai) = tT , (3)
for variables X1, . . . ,Xn ∈ G and constants tT ∈ GT , A1, . . . ,An ∈ Gˆ, aij ∈ Zp, for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
In pairing-product equations, proving a linear equation costs 2 group elements under the SXDH
assumption: for an equation of the form (3), the proof fits within two elements of Gˆ.
In [6], Belenkiy et al. showed that Groth-Sahai proofs are perfectly randomizable. Given com-
mitments {CXi}
n
i=1 and a NIWI proof piPPE that committed {X}
n
i=1 satisfy (3), anyone can publicly
compute re-randomized commitments {CX ′i }
n
i=1 and a re-randomized proof pi
′
PPE of the same state-
ment. Moreover, {CX ′i }
n
i=1 and pi
′
PPE are distributed as freshly generated commitments and proof.
B Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. The proof proceeds with a sequence of three games. The latter begins with Game 0, which is
the real game, and ends with Game 2, where any PPT adversary is shown to contradict the Double
Pairing assumption. For each j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, Sj denotes the event that the adversary wins in Game j.
We assume w.l.o.g. that the adversary A always queries the random oracle H before any signing
query for the same message M . The challenger can always enforce this by making random oracle
queries for itself. We also assume that random oracle queries are distinct.
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Game 0: This is the real game. Namely, the challenger runs the Dist-Keygen protocol on behalf of all
uncorrupted players. Whenever the adversary A decides to corrupt a player Pi, the challenger sets
C = C ∪ {i}, G = G\{i} and faithfully reveals the internal state of Pi, which includes Pi’s private
key share SKi = {(Ak(i), Bk(i))}
2
k=1 and his polynomials {Aik[X], Bik[X]}
2
k=1 if the corruption
query occurs after step 1.a of Dist-Keygen. Whenever a player Pi is corrupted, A receives full con-
trol over Pi and may cause him to arbitrarily deviate from the protocol. Queries to the random
oracle H are answered by returning uniformly random group elements in G2. Partial signature
queries (i,M) are answered by returning the values (zi, ri) =
(∏2
k=1H
−Ak(i)
k ,
∏2
k=1H
−Bk(i)
k
)
.
At the end of the game, A outputs a message-signature pair
(
σ⋆ = (z⋆, r⋆),M⋆
)
. We assume
that the adversary queries H(M⋆) before producing its forgery. We denote by S0 the event that
σ⋆ = (z⋆, r⋆) is a valid signature.
In the following, we define Ak[X] =
∑
i∈QAik[X] and Bk[X] =
∑
i∈QBik[X] as well as
(ak0, bk0) = (
∑
i∈Q aik0,
∑
i∈Q bik0) for each k ∈ {1, 2}. We remark that, at the end of the
Dist-Keygen protocol, the challenger knows the polynomials {Ajk[X], Bjk[X]}
2
k=1 and the ad-
ditive shares {(ajk0, bjk0)}
2
k=1 of all non-disqualified players j ∈ Q. Indeed, for each j ∈ Q ∩ C
such that Pj was corrupted before step 1.a of the distributed key generation phase, it obtained at
least t+ 1 shares {Ajk(i), Bjk(i)}
2
k=1, which is sufficient for reconstructing {Ajk[X], Bjk[X]}
2
k=1.
As for other players Pj such that j ∈ Q, the challenger honestly chose their sharing polynomials
at step 1.a of Dist-Keygen.
Game 1: This game is identical to Game 0 with the following difference. For each random oracle
query H(M), the challenger B flips a biased coin ϑM ∈ {0, 1} that takes the value 1 with
probability 1/(qs + 1) and the value 0 with probability qs/(qs + 1). When the game ends, B
considers the event E that either of the following conditions holds:
– For the message M⋆, the coin ϑM⋆ ∈ {0, 1} flipped for the hash query H(M
⋆) was ϑM⋆ = 0.
– There exists signing query (i,M) with M 6=M⋆ for which ϑM = 1.
If event E occurs (which B can detect at the end of the game), B halts and declares failure. The
same analysis as that of Coron [20] shows that Pr[¬E] = 1/e(qs + 1), where e is the base for the
natural logarithm. The transition from Game 0 to Game 1 is thus a transition based on a failure
event of large probability [27] and we thus have Pr[S1] = Pr[S0] · Pr[¬E] = Pr[S0]/e(qs + 1).
Game 2: We modify the distribution of random oracle outputs. Specifically, the challenger B chooses
generators g, h R← G at the beginning of the game and uses them to answer random oracle queries.
The treatment of each hash query H(M) depends on the random coin ϑM ∈ {0, 1}.
– If ϑM = 0, the challenger B chooses a random αM
R← Zp, and programs the random oracle so
as to have H(M) = (gαM , hαM ). Note that the resulting hash value H(M) ∈ G2 is no longer
uniform in G2 as it now lives in the one-dimensional space spanned by the vector (g, h) ∈ G2.
– If ϑM = 1, B chooses a uniformly random pair (gM , hM ) ∈ G
2 and programs H(M) so as to
have H(M) = (gM , hM ).
Lemma 1 below shows that Game 2 and Game 1 are computationally indistinguishable if the
DDH assumption holds in the group G. It follows that |Pr[S2]− Pr[S1]| ≤ Adv
DDH1(B).
In Game 2, we claim that Pr[S2] ≤ Adv(B)
DP(λ)+1/p as B can be turned into an algorithm solving
the DP problem.
Indeed, with probability 1/e(qs+1), the hash value H(M
⋆) = (H⋆1 , H
⋆
2 ) ∈ G
2 is uniformly random
for the message M⋆ involved in the forgery (z⋆, r⋆) whereas, for each signed message M such that
M 6= M⋆, H(M) = (H1, H2) lives in the one-dimensional subspace spanned by (g, h). We also note
that, while the adversary is allowed to submit queries of the form (i,M⋆) to the partial signing oracle,
these queries do not reveal any more information than if the challenger were simply handing over the
corresponding private share SKi. We thus treat these partial signing queries for M
⋆ as corruption
queries. When A halts, the challenger determines which players have generated a partial signature
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on M⋆ and moves them from G to C. Note that, for these updated sets G and C, it still knows the
polynomials {(Ajk[X], Bjk[X])}
2
k=1 for all j ∈ C. Let us define the aggregated additive shares
ak,G =
∑
j∈G
ajk0 bk,G =
∑
j∈G
bjk0 k ∈ {1, 2}.
ak,Q∩C =
∑
j∈Q∩C
ajk0 bk,Q∩C =
∑
j∈Q∩C
bjk0
We remark that all pairs {(ak,G , bk,G)}
2
k=1 are uniformly distributed in Z
2
p since they are obtained by
summing additive shares that were honestly chosen by the challenger.
We also argue that a2,G is independent of A’s view. To see this, let us consider what an unbounded
A can learn during the game. Corruption queries reveal {Aj2(i)}j∈G,i∈C , which is insufficient to infer
anything about a2,G =
∑
j∈G Aj2(0) since |C| ≤ t. For each M 6= M
⋆, signing queries are answered
by returning
(zi, ri) =
(
H
−A1(i)
1 H
−A2(i)
2 , H
−B1(i)
1 H
−B2(i)
2
)
=
(
(g−A1(i) · h−A2(i))αM , (g−B1(i) · h−B2(i))αM
)
.
Note that the information supplied by ri is redundant since, for a given pair (H1, H2) and a given
zi ∈ G, there is only one ri ∈ G satisfying e(zi, gˆz) · e(ri, gˆr) ·
∏2
k=1 e(Hk, Vˆk,i) = 1GT . Since A knows
{(Ajk[X], Bjk[X])}
2
k=1 for each j ∈ Q ∩ C, it can obtain
zi,G =
(
g−
∑
j∈G Aj1(i) · h−
∑
j∈G Aj2(i)
)αM , (4)
However, these partial signatures (zi, ri) on M 6= M
⋆ only provide A with redundant information
about
(∑
j∈G Aj1(i),
∑
j∈G Aj2(i),
∑
j∈G Bj1(i),
∑
j∈G Bj2(i)
)
. The only thing that A really learns
from (4) is the value
∑
j∈G(Aj1(i) + ω · Aj2(i)), where ω = logg(h). In addition, during step 2
of the Dist-Keygen protocol, relation (1) also provides the adversary with gˆz
Ajk(i)gˆr
Bjk(i) for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ G and k ∈ {1, 2}. Still, the only way to leverage these pieces of information
is to interpolate them and get a1,G + ω · a2,G as well as {ak,G + ρ · bk,G}
2
k=1, where ρ = loggˆz(gˆr),
which leaves A with a system of 3 equations in 4 unknowns {(ak,G , bk,G)}
2
k=1. As a consequence, a2,G
remains completely undetermined in A’s view as long as |C| ≤ t.
The lack of adversarial information about a2,G allows solving the DP problem as follows. For
the target message M⋆, we can write (H⋆1 , H
⋆
2 ) = (g
αM⋆ , hαM⋆+γ), for some random αM⋆ , γ ∈R Zp.
This implies that, if the challenger computes a product (z†, r†) of its own partial signatures on the
message M⋆ using the sum (a1,G , a2,G , b1,G , b2,G) of its additive shares, this product can be written as
(z†, r†) =
(
H⋆1
−a1,G ·H⋆2
−a2,G , H⋆1
−b1,G ·H⋆2
−b2,G
)
=
(
(ga1,G · ha2,G )−αM⋆ · h−γ·a2,G , (gb1,G · hb2,G )−αM⋆ · h−γ·b2,G
)
, (5)
where z† is completely unpredictable by A. Indeed, in the right-hand-side member of (5), A can
information-theoretically determine the term (ga1,G ·ha1,G )αM⋆ by interpolating the discrete logarithms∑
j∈G(Aj,1(i) + ωAj,2(i)) obtained from (4) (note that, although (g, h) are not explicitly given to A,
they can be inferred, in the same way as exponents αM and αM⋆ , by observing hash values). However,
the uniformly random term h−γ·a2,G remains completely independent of A’s view.
Now, the challenger can use the adversary’s forgery (z⋆, r⋆) to compute
(z⋄, r⋄) =
(
z⋆ ·H⋆1
a1,Q∩C ·H⋆2
a2,Q∩C , r⋆ ·H⋆1
b1,Q∩C ·H⋆2
b2,Q∩C
)
,
which, if we define gˆ1,G = gˆz
a1,G · gˆr
b1,G and gˆ2,G = gˆz
a2,G · gˆr
b2,G , is easily seen to satisfy
e(z⋄, gˆz) · e(r
⋄, gˆz) · e(H
⋆
1 , gˆ1,G) · e(H
⋆
2 , gˆ2,G) = 1GT
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since gˆ1 = gˆ1,G · gˆz
a1,Q∩C · gˆr
b1,Q∩C and gˆ2 = gˆ2,G · gˆz
a2,Q∩C · gˆr
b2,Q∩C .
From (5), we see that (z†, r†) also satisfies e(z†, gˆz) · e(r
†, gˆz) · e(H
⋆
1 , gˆ1,G) · e(H
⋆
2 , gˆ2,G) = 1GT by
construction. Given that z† is independent of A’s view, the quotient (z†/z⋄, r†/r⋄) forms a non-trivial
solution to the DP instance (gˆz, gˆr) with probability 1− 1/p. Such a solution easily allows building
a distinguisher for the DDH problem in Gˆ. We thus find the upper bound
Adv(A) ≤ e · (qs + 1) ·
(
AdvDDH1(B) +AdvDDH2(B) +
1
p
)
, (6)
where qs is the number of signing queries and e is the base for the natural logarithm. ⊓⊔
We remark that the proof goes through if, during the key generation phase, each player Pi
additionally publicizes (Zi0, Ri0) =
(
g−ai10h−ai20 , g−bi10h−bi20
)
, for public g, h ∈ G, which satisfies
e(Zi0, gˆz) ·e(Ri0, gˆr) ·e(h, Wˆi10) ·e(g, Wˆi20) = 1GT and thus forms a LHSPS on (g, h) for the public key
{Wˆik0}
2
k=1. Indeed, if we consider the information that each player initially reveals about its local
additive shares (ai10, ai20, bi10, bi20) ∈ Z
4
p, it amounts to the discrete logarithms of (Wˆi10, Wˆi20, Zi0).
The only extra information revealed by Zi0 is thus ai10 + ω · ai20, where ω = logg(h), which leaves
ai20 undetermined. While an unbounded adversary can compute the sum a1,G + ω · a2,G in Game 2,
it still has no information about a2,G =
∑
j∈G aj20. In Appendix G, we use this observation to show
a simple modification of the scheme that supports signature aggregation.
C Definition and Template of Linearly Homomorphic Structure-Preserving
Signatures
Let (G, Gˆ,GT ) be groups of prime order p such that a bilinear map e : G× Gˆ→ GT can be efficiently
computed.
A signature scheme is structure-preserving [3] if messages, signatures and public keys live in
the groups G or Gˆ. In linearly homomorphic structure-preserving signatures, the message space M
consists of pairs M := T ×GN , for some N ∈ N, where T is a tag space.
Definition 4. A linearly homomorphic structure-preserving signature scheme over (G, Gˆ,GT ) is
a tuple of efficient algorithms Σ = (Keygen, Sign, SignDerive,Verify) for which the message space
consists of M := T × GN , for some integer n ∈ poly(λ) and some set T , and with the following
specifications.
Keygen(λ,N): is a randomized algorithm that takes in a security parameter λ ∈ N and an integer
N ∈ poly(λ) denoting the dimension of vectors to be signed. It outputs a key pair (pk, sk), where
pk includes the description of a tag space T , where each tag serves as a file identifier.
Sign(sk, τ,M): is a possibly randomized algorithm that takes as input a private key sk, a file iden-
tifier τ ∈ T and a vector M = (M1, . . . ,MN ) ∈ G
N . It outputs a signature σ ∈ Gns, for some
ns ∈ poly(λ).
SignDerive(pk, τ, {(ωi, σ
(i))}ℓi=1): is a (possibly randomized) derivation algorithm. It inputs a pub-
lic key pk, a file identifier τ as well as ℓ pairs (ωi, σ
(i)), each of which consists of a coefficient
ωi ∈ Zp and a signature σ
(i) ∈ Gns. It outputs a signature σ ∈ Gns on the vectorM =
∏ℓ
i=1M
ωi
i ,
where σ(i) is a signature on M i.
Verify(pk, τ,M, σ): is a deterministic verification algorithm that takes as input a public key pk, a
file identifier τ ∈ T , a signature σ and a vector M = (M1, . . . ,MN ). It outputs 0 or 1 depending
on whether σ is deemed valid or not.
In a one-time linearly homomorphic SPS, the tag τ can be omitted in the specification as a given
key pair (pk, sk) only allows signing one linear subspace.
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As in all linearly homomorphic signatures, the security requirement is that the adversary be
unable to create a valid triple (τ⋆,M⋆, σ⋆) for a new file identifier τ⋆ or, if τ⋆ is recycled from one
or more honestly generated signatures, for a vector M⋆ outside the linear span of the vectors that
have been legitimately signed for the tag τ⋆.
An important property is that the SignDerive algorithm must operate on vectors that are all
labeled with the same tag.
Template of One-Time LHSPS. In [53], it was observed that any linearly homomorphic structure-
preserving signature satisfies a certain template. In the case of one-time LHSPS, this template can
be simplified as follows in bilinear groups (G, Gˆ,GT ).
Keygen(λ,N): given λ and the dimension N ∈ N of the vectors to be signed, choose constants
nz,m. Among these, ns will determine the signature length while m will be the number of
verification equations. Then, choose {Fˆj,µ}j∈{1,...,m},µ∈{1,...,ns}, {Gˆj,k}k∈{1,...,N}, j∈{j,...,m} in the
group Gˆ. The public key is pk =
(
{Fˆj,µ}j∈{1,...,m},µ∈{1,...,ns}, {Gˆj,k}k∈{1,...,N}, j∈{j,...,m}
)
while sk
contains information about the representation of public elements w.r.t. specific bases.
Sign(sk, (M1, . . . ,MN)): A vector (M1, . . . ,MN ) ∈ G
N is signed by outputting a tuple of the form
σ =
(
Z1, . . . , Zns
)
∈ Gns .
SignDerive(pk, {(ωi, σ
(i))}ℓi=1): parses each σ
(i) as
(
Z
(i)
1 , . . . , Z
(i)
ns
)
and computes
Zµ =
ℓ∏
i=1
Z(i)µ
ωi
µ ∈ {1, . . . , ns}.
After a possible extra re-randomization step, it outputs
(
Z1, . . . , Zns
)
.
Verify(pk, σ, (M1, . . . ,MN)): given a signature σ =
(
Z1, . . . , Zns
)
∈ Gns and (M1, . . . ,MN ), re-
turn 0 if (M1, . . . ,MN ) = (1G, . . . , 1G). Otherwise, return 1 if and only if the following equalities
hold for j = 1 to m:
1GT =
ns∏
µ=1
e(Zµ, Fˆj,µ) ·
N∏
k=1
e(Mk, Gˆj,k) j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (7)
D Generic Signatures from One-Time Linearly Homomorphic Signature
This section shows that any one-time LHSPS can be used to build fully secure signatures in the
random oracle model and in the standard model.
D.1 Generic Construction in the Random Oracle Model from the K-Linear
Assumption
Let us first recall the following assumption which is a generalization of the DDH and Decision Linear
assumptions.
Definition 5. For K > 0, the K-Linear assumption states that, given (g, g1, . . . , gK , g
a1
1 , . . . , g
aK
K , η) ∈
G
2K+2, no PPT algorithm can decide if η = ga1+···+aK or η ∈R G.
For K = 1 (resp. K = 2), the K-linear assumption coincides with the DDH (resp. DLIN) assumption.
Given any one-time linearly homomorphic signature Π = (Keygen, Sign, SignDerive,Verify) with
homomorphic key generation that works over possibly asymmetric bilinear groups (G, Gˆ,GT ), we
can use a random oracle to build the following fully secure signature scheme under the K-Linear
assumption.
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Keygen(λ): Given a security parameter λ, the system is set up by conducting the following steps.
1. Generate a LHSPS key pair (pk, sk)← Π.Keygen(λ,K+1) for vectors of dimension N = K+1.
Parse pk as pk =
(
(G, Gˆ,GT ), {Fˆi,j,µ}j∈{1,...,m},µ∈{1,...,ns}, {Gˆi,j,k}j∈{j,...,m},k∈{1,...,K+1}
)
.
2. Choose a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → GK+1, which will be modeled as a random oracle in
the security analysis.
Return the public key
PK = pk =
(
{Fˆj,µ}j∈{1,...,m},µ∈{1,...,ns}, {Gˆj,k}j∈{j,...,m},k∈{1,...,K+1}
)
and the private key SK = sk.
Sign(SK,M): To sign a message M ∈ {0, 1}∗ using SK = sk, conduct the following steps.
1. Compute (H1, . . . , HK+1) = H(M) ∈ G
K+1.
2. Using sk, compute and output
σ = (Z1, . . . , Zns)← Π.Sign(sk, (H1, . . . , HK+1)) ∈ G
ns .
Verify(PK,M, σ): Given M ∈ {0, 1}L and a purported signature σi, parse σ as (Z1, . . . , Zns) ∈ G
ns
and return 1 if Π.Verify(pk, (H1, . . . , HK+1), σi) = 1, where (H1, . . . , HK+1) = H(M) ∈ G
K+1.
Otherwise, it returns 0.
It is immediate that the construction is correct. We prove that it is fully secure in the random
oracle model if the underlying LHSPS is one-time secure.
Theorem 3. The scheme provides existential unforgeability under chosen-message attacks in the
random oracle model assuming that: (i) Π is a secure one-time LHSPS; (ii) The k-Linear assumption
holds in G.
Proof. The proof proceeds with a sequence of games.
Game 0: This is the real attack game. The challenger generates a public key PK which is given to
the adversary A. After a series of adaptive signing queries, A produces a forgery σ⋆ on a message
M⋆ that has never been submitted to the signing oracle. We define S0 as the event that (σ
⋆,M⋆)
is a valid forgery.
Game 1: This game is like Game 0 but we modify the treatment of random oracle queries. For
each hash query H(M), the challenger B flips a coin ϑM ∈ {0, 1} that yields the value 1 with
probability 1/(qs+1) and 0 with probability qs/(qs+1). At the end of the game, B considers the
event E that either of the following conditions holds:
– For the target message M⋆, the coin ϑM⋆ ∈ {0, 1} flipped for the hash query H(M
⋆) was
ϑM⋆ = 0.
– There was a partial signing query (i,M) for which ϑM = 1.
If event E occurs, B halts and fails. Coron’s analysis [20] shows that Pr[¬E] = 1/e(qs+1), which
implies Pr[S1] = Pr[S0] · Pr[¬E] = Pr[S0]/e(qs + 1).
Game 2: This game is identical to Game 1 except for one difference. At the outset of the game,
B picks g, g1, . . . , gK
R← G, a1, . . . , aK
R← Zp and defines vectors g1 = (g
a1
1 , 1, . . . 1, g) ∈ G
K+1,
g2 = (1, g
a2
2 , 1, . . . 1, g) ∈ G
K+1, . . . , gK = (1, . . . , 1, g
aK
K , g) ∈ G
K+1. Then, the distribution of
random oracle outputs is modified as follow depending on the random coin ϑM ∈ {0, 1}.
– If ϑM = 0, the challenger B defines H(M) ∈ G
K+1 to be a random linear combination
(H1, . . . , Hk) = g
α1
1 · · · g
αK
K ,
where α1, . . . , αK
R← Zp. Note that H(M) lives in a proper subspace of G
K+1.
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– If ϑM = 1, B defines H(M) as a random vector of G
K+1.
Clearly, although H is no longer a true random oracle, it still looks like one in A’s view if the
K-Linear assumption holds. We have |Pr[S2]− Pr[S1]| ≤ Adv
K-LIN(B).
In Game 2, A can be used by the challenger B to break the one-time security of Π. Specifically, B
takes as input a public key pk for Π, which is also given as a challenge public key to A.
Before starting its interaction with A, our LHSPS adversary B invokes its own challenger to
obtain linearly homomorphic signatures σ˜1, . . . , σ˜K on the vectors g1, . . . , gK ∈ G
K+1. If event ¬E
occurs, we know that A only obtains signatures on messages M such that H(M) lives in the linear
subspace spanned by (g1, . . . , gK). In this case, B is always able to answer signing queries on its own.
Indeed, it can use the coefficients α1, . . . , αK ∈ Zp such that H(M) =
∏K
i=1 g
αi
i in order to obtain
and return a signature σ ← Π.SignDerive(pk, {(αi, σ˜i)}
K
i=1) on M without any further help from its
own signing oracle.
When the adversary outputs a valid forgery (σ⋆,M⋆), we know that, if event ¬E occurs, the
vector H(M⋆) = (H1, . . . , HK+1) lands outside span(g1, . . . , gk), which means that (σ
⋆, H(M⋆)) is a
valid forgery for Π. ⊓⊔
D.2 Construction in the Standard model from any One-Time LHSPS
This section shows how to use the DLIN-based instantiation of Groth-Sahai proofs to build a fully
secure digital signature from any one-time LHSPS in symmetric bilinear groups (i.e., where G = Gˆ).
In the standard model, the generic construction uses the same design principle as the scheme
of Section 4 in that it proceeds by generating a non-interactive proof of knowledge of a one-time
homomorphic signature on a fixed vector. The difference is that, while NIWI proofs for pairing
product equations were sufficient in the scheme of Section 4, we need NIZK proofs here. Fortunately,
although pairing product equations are not known to always admit efficient NIZK simulators, they
can be realized while keeping constant-size signatures.
Given any one-time linearly homomorphic signature Π = (Keygen, Sign, SignDerive,Verify) in
symmetric bilinear groups, we can construct a fully secure signature as follows.
Keygen(λ): The system is set up by conducting the following steps.
1. Generate a LHSPS key pair (pk, sk)← Π.Keygen(λ, 1) for vectors of dimension N = 1. Parse
pk as pk =
(
(G,GT ), {Fi,j,µ}j∈{1,...,m},µ∈{1,...,ns}, {Gi,j}j∈{j,...,m}
)
.
2. Choose generators g, g1, g2
R← G and define vectors g1 = (g1, 1, g), g2 = (1, g2, g). Choose
L+ 1 random vectors f0,f1, . . . ,fL
R← G3.
Return the public key
PK =
(
(G,GT ), (g1, g2, {f i}
L
i=0), pk =
(
{Fj,µ}j∈{1,...,m},µ∈{1,...,ns}, {Gj}j∈{j,...,m}
))
and the secret key SK = sk.
Sign(SK,M): To generate a signature on a message M =M [1] . . .M [L] ∈ {0, 1}L using the private
key SK = sk, do the following.
1. Generate (Z1, . . . , Zns) ← Π.Sign(sk, g) as a one-time homomorphic signature on the one-
dimensional vector g ∈ G.
2. Using the bits M [1] . . .M [L] of M ∈ {0, 1}L, define the vector fM = f0 ·
∏L
i=1 f
M [i]
i so as to
assemble a Groth-Sahai CRS fM = (g1, g2,fM ).
3. Using fM = (f ,fM ), compute Groth-Sahai commitments
CZ,µ = (1G, Zµ) · g
ν1,µ
1 · g
ν2,µ
2 · f
ν3,µ
M
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to {Zµ}
ns
µ=1 for µ ∈ {1, . . . , ns}. Then, generate NIZK proofs pij ∈ G
6 that (Z1, . . . , Zns)
satisfy the verification equations
1GT = e(g,Gj) ·
ns∏
µ=1
e(Zµ, Fj,µ) j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
These NIZK proofs are obtained by proving that
1GT = e(g,Θj) ·
ns∏
µ=1
e(Zµ, Fj,µ) j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (8)
1GT = e(g,Θj) · (g,G
−1
j ) (9)
using extra variables Θj = Gj and their commitments CΘj = (1G, Θj) · g
θ1,j
1 · g
θ2,j
2 · f
θ3,j
M . as
pij = (πj,1, πi,2, πj,3, πj,4, πj,5, πj,6)
=
(
g−θ1,j ·
ns∏
µ=1
F
−ν1,µ
j,µ , g
−θ2,j ·
ns∏
µ=1
F
−ν2,µ
j,µ , g
−θ3,j ·
ns∏
µ=1
F
−ν3,µ
j,µ , g
−θ1,j , g−τ2,j , g−θ3,j
)
Return the partial signature σi = (CZ,1, . . . ,CZ,ns ,CΘ1 , . . . ,CΘm ,pi1, . . . ,pim) ∈ G
3ns+9m.
Verify(PK,M, σ): Given a L-bit message M ∈ {0, 1}L and a purported signature σ, parse σ as
(CZ,1, . . . ,CZ,ns ,CΘ1 , . . . ,CΘm ,pi1, . . . ,pim) ∈ G
3ns+9m, where pij = (πj,1, πj,2, πj,3, πj,4, πj,5, πj,6)
for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Return 1 if it satisfies
1GT = E
(
g,CΘj
)
·
ns∏
µ=1
E
(
Fµ,CZ,µ
)
· E(g1, πj,1) · E(g2, πj,2) · E(fM , πj,3)
1GT = E
(
g,CΘj
)
· E
(
g−1, (1G, 1G, Gj)
)
· E(g1, πj,4) · E(g2, πj,5) · E(fM , πj,6),
where fM = f0 ·
∏L
i=1 f
M [i]
i .
The proof of security proceeds in the same way as the proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix H. The
main change is that we need NIZK proofs for pairing product equations here.
Theorem 4. The scheme provides existential unforgeability assuming that Π is a secure one-time
LHSPS and that the DLIN assumption holds in G.
Proof. The proof proceeds with a sequence of games.
Game 0: This is the actual game. We call S0 the event that the adversary A wins.
Game 1: We modify the generation of the public key. Namely, the vectors (g1, g2, {f i}
L
i=0) are
chosen as g1 = (g1, 1, g), g2 = (1, g2, g) and {f i}
L
i=0, where
f0 = g
ξ0,1
1 · g
ξ0,2
1 · (1, 1, g)
ξ0,3 · (1, 1, g)µ·ζ−ρ0 (10)
f i = g
ξi,1
1 · g
ξi,2
2 · (1, 1, g)
ξi,3 · (1, g)−ρi , i ∈ {1, . . . , L}
with µ R← {0, . . . , L}, ξ0,1, ξ1,1, . . . , ξL,1
R← Zp, ξ0,2, ξ1,2, . . . , ξL,2
R← Zp, ξ0,3, ξ1,3, . . . , ξL,3
R← Zp
and ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρL
R← {0, . . . , ζ − 1}, with ζ = 2q and where q is the number of partial signature
queries. We note that {f i}
L
i=0 have the same distribution as in Game 0, so that Pr[S1] = Pr[S0].
21
Game 2: We raise an event F2 and let the simulator B abort if it occurs. Let M1, . . . ,Mq be the
messages submitted by the adversary to the partial signing oracle during the game. For each
message M =M [1] . . .M [L] ∈ {0, 1}L, we define the function J(M) = µ · ζ − ρ0 −
∑L
i=1 ρi ·M [i]
and define F2 to be the event that either
- J(M⋆) 6= 0
- There exists a message Mj ∈ {M1, . . . ,Mq} such that J(Mj) = 0.
We remark that ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρL are completely independent of A’s view. The same analysis as [70,
8] shows that Pr[S2 ∧ ¬F2] ≥ Pr[S1]
2/(27 · q · (L+ 1)).
Game 3: We change the distribution of public parameters. Namely, g1 and g2 are chosen as before
but, instead of generating {f i}
L
i=0 as in Game 2, they are generated as
f0 = g
ξ0,1
1 · g
ξ0,2
2 · (1, 1, g)
µ·ζ−ρ0 (11)
f i = g
ξi,1
1 · g
ξi,2
1 · (1, 1, g)
−ρi , i ∈ {1, . . . , L}
which amounts to setting ξ0,3 = ξ1,3 = . . . = ξL,3 = 0. Under the DLIN assumption in G,
this change should not noticeable modify the probability of event S2 ∧¬F2. Concretely, if events
S2∧¬F2 and S3∧¬F2 occur with significantly different probabilities in Game 2 and Game 3, we can
construct a DLIN distinguisher B. The latter takes as input a DLIN instance (g, g1, g2, g
a
1 , g
b
2, Z),
where a, b R← Zp and Z = g
a+b or Z ∈R G. Using the random self-reducibility of DLIN, we can
create L + 1 DLIN instances – which are all linear tuples (resp. random tuples) if Z = ga+b
(resp. Z ∈R G) – and embed them in {f i}
L
i=0 in such a way that {f i}
L
i=0 is distributed as in
Game 2 (resp. Game 3) if Z ∈R G (resp. Z = g
a+b). For this reason, we obtain the inequality
|Pr[S3 ∧ ¬F2]− Pr[S2 ∧ ¬F2]| ≤ Adv
DLIN(B).
Game 4: We modify the signature generation oracle. Namely, at each signing query on a message
M =M [1] . . .M [L], the challenger assembles the Groth-Sahai CRS (g1, g2,fM ), where
fM = f0 ·
L∏
i=1
f
M [i]
i = g
K1(M)
1 · g
K2(M)
2 · (1, 1, g)
J(M),
where K1(M) = ξ0,1 +
∑L
i=1 ξi,1, K2(M) = ξ0,2 +
∑L
i=1 ξi,2. Using the trapdoor information
(K1(M),K2(M), J(M)), the challenger generates a simulated NIZK proof pii,j .
To generate a proof for equation (8), B uses the assignment Θj = 1G and Zµ = 1G for µ ∈
{1, . . . , ns}, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, which allows honestly generating a proof for (8). As for equation (9),
the challenger can use (K1(M),K2(M), J(M)) to generate a fake proof that Θj = Gj by trapdoor
opening the commitment to CΘj = g
θ1,j
1 · g
θ2,j
2 · f
θ3,j
M which was computed as a commitment to
1G. Namely, it can compute
πj,4 = g
θ1,j ·G
K1(M)
J(M)
j , πj,5 = g
θ2,j ·G
K2(M)
J(M)
j , πj,6 = g
θ3,j ·G
− 1
J(M)
j ,
which forms a valid proof for equation (9) and is always computable when J(M) 6= 0. Given
that simulated NIZK proofs are perfectly indistinguishable from real proofs on a witness indis-
tinguishable CRS, A’s view is the same as in Game 3, so that Pr[S4 ∧ ¬F2] = Pr[S3 ∧ ¬F2].
In Game 4, we claim that B can be turned into a LHSPS forger running in about the same time as
A and for which Pr[S4 ∧ ¬F2] ≤ Adv
LHSPS(B).
To break the security of Π, B interacts with its own challenger that provides it with a public
key pk =
(
{Fj,µ}j∈{1,...,m},µ∈{1,...,ns}, {Gj}j∈{j,...,m}
)
for Π. Then, B generates (g1, g2, {f i}
L
i=0) as in
Game 4 so as to form PK, which is given to A.
The adversary’s signing queries are answered by simulating NIZK proofs as in Game 4 in such
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a way that B never has to invoke its own signing oracle. When the adversary outputs a forgery
(σ⋆,M⋆), we know that (g1, g2,fM ) is an extractable Groth-Sahai CRS if event ¬F2 occurs. Using
the discrete logarithms (logg(g1), logg(g2)), B can thus extract a valid LHSPS from the Groth-Sahai
commitments contained in σ⋆. ⊓⊔
E Deferred Proofs for Theorem 1
Lemma 1. Under the DDH assumption in G, Game 2 is computationally indistinguishable from
Game 1.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction and builds a straightforward DDH distinguisher B from an
adversary A that has noticeably different behaviors in Game 1 and Game 2.
The reduction B receives as input a pair (g, gx, gy, T ) and has to decide whether T = gxy or
T ∈R G. To this end, algorithm B begins by generating PK, SK and VK in the same way as in the
real scheme. In addition, it defines h = gy. Throughout the game, B always answers partial signing
queries and corruption queries faithfully. However, the treatment of random oracle queries H(M)
depends on the value of the biased coin δM ∈ {0, 1}. Namely, when δM = 0, B uses the random
self-reducibility of DDH and builds many DDH instances out of one.
– If δM = 0, B chooses αM , βM
R← Zp, computes
(gM , hM ) = ((g
x)αM · gβM , TαM · (gy)βM )
and programs the random oracle so as to have H(M) = (H1, H2) = (gM , hM ). Observe that,
if T = gxy, the pair (H1, H2) = (gM , hM ) has the same distribution as in Game 2 as it can be
written (H1, H2) = (g
zM , hzM ) with zM = x · αM + βM . In contrast, if T ∈R G, we can write
T = gxy+z for some random z ∈R Zp. In this case, we have (H1, H2) = (g
zM , hzM+x·αM ), so that
(H1, H2) ∈R G
2.
– If δM = 1, B draws gM , hM
R← G2 and defines H(M) = (gM , hM ).
When A terminates, B outputs a random bit if event E has come about during the game. Otherwise,
B outputs 1 if b′ = b and 0 otherwise.
Clearly, if T = gxy, A’s view is exactly the same as in Game 2. In contrast, if T is uniform in G,
B is rather playing Game 1 with the adversary. ⊓⊔
F A Construction Based on the DLIN Assumption
This section shows a variant of our first construction based on the Decision Linear assumption [11],
which is believed to be strictly weaker than SXDH. The scheme retains adaptive security in the
random oracle model even in groups (G, Gˆ,GT ) endowed with efficiently computable isomorphisms
between G and Gˆ.
Definition 6 ([11]). The Decision Linear Problem (DLIN) in G, is to distinguish the distribu-
tions (ga, gb, gac, gbd, gc+d) and (ga, gb, gac, gbd, gz), with a, b, c, d R← Zp, z
R← Zp.
For convenience, we also consider the following assumption.
Definition 7. The Simultaneous Double Pairing problem (SDP) in (G, Gˆ,GT ) is, given a tuple
(gˆz, gˆr, hˆz, hˆu) ∈ Gˆ
4, to find a non-trivial triple (z, r, u) ∈ G3\{(1G, 1G, 1G)} such that the equalities
e(z, gˆz) · e(r, gˆr) = 1GT and e(z, hˆz) · e(u, hˆu) = 1GT are satisfied.
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Any algorithm solving the SDP problem immediately yields a DLIN distinguisher in the group Gˆ.
From a DLIN2 instance (gˆ, gˆ
a, gˆac, gˆb, gˆbd, η), we create an SDP instance (gˆac, gˆa, gˆbd, gˆb). If the SDP
solver finds (z, r, u) such that e(z, gˆac) · e(r, gˆa) = 1GT and e(z, gˆ
bd) · e(u, gˆb) = 1GT , we know that
r = z−c and u = z−d. To decide if η = gˆc+d, it is sufficient to check whether e(r ·u, gˆ) · e(z, η) = 1GT .
Here, we need public parameters params consisting of four generators gˆz, gˆr, hˆz, hˆu ∈R Gˆ. Again,
gˆr, hˆz, hˆu can be derived from a random oracle so as to avoid the need to generate them in a in a
distributed manner while still making sure that no party knows their discrete logarithms.
Dist-Keygen(params, λ, t, n): given params = {(G, Gˆ,GT ), gˆz, gˆr, hˆz, hˆu, , H}, a security parameter λ
and integers t, n ∈ N such that n ≥ 2t+ 1, the player P1, . . . , Pn proceed as follows.
1. Each player Pi shares random triples {(aik0, bik0, cik0)}
3
k=1. To this end, he does the following:
a. For each k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, choose random polynomials Aik[X] = aik0 + aik1X + · · · + aiktX
t,
Bik[X] = bik0 + bik1X + · · ·+ biktX
t and Cik[X] = cik0 + cik1X + · · ·+ ciktX
t ∈ Zp[X] of
degree t and broadcast
Vˆikℓ = gˆz
aikℓ gˆr
bikℓ Wˆikℓ = hˆz
aikℓ
hˆu
cikℓ
∀ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , t}
b. For j = 1 to n, send {(Aik(j), Bik(j), Cik(j))}
3
k=1 to Pj .
2. For each received shares {(Ajk(i), Bjk(i), Cjk(i))}
3
k=1, player Pi verifies that
gˆ
Ajk(i)
z gˆ
Bjk(i)
r =
t∏
ℓ=0
Vˆ i
ℓ
jkℓ hˆ
Ajk(i)
z hˆ
Cjk(i)
u =
t∏
ℓ=0
Wˆ i
ℓ
jkℓ ∀k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. (12)
If these equalities do not both hold, Pi broadcasts a complaint against Pj .
3. Any player who receives strictly more than t complaints is disqualified. Each player Pi
who received a complaint from another player Pj responds by returning the correct shares
{(Aik(j), Bik(j), Cik(j))}
3
k=1. If any of these new shares does not satisfy (12), Pi is disqual-
ified. Let Q ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be the set of players who are not disqualified at the end of step
3.
4. The public key is obtained as PK = {gˆk, hˆk}
3
k=1, where gˆk =
∏
i∈Q Vˆik0 = gˆ
∑
i∈Q aik0
z gˆ
∑
i∈Q bik0
r
and hˆk =
∏
i∈Q Wˆik0 = hˆ
∑
i∈Q aik0
z hˆ
∑
i∈Q cik0
u . Each Pi locally defines his private key share
SKi = {(Ak(i), Bk(i), Ck(i))}
3
k=1 = {
(∑
j∈Q
Ajk(i),
∑
j∈Q
Bjk(i),
∑
j∈Q
Cjk(i)
)
}3k=1
and anyone can publicly compute his verification key
V Ki =
(
{Uˆk,i = gˆz
Ak(i)gˆr
Bk(i)}3k=1, {Zˆk,i = hˆz
Ak(i)
hˆu
Ck(i)
}3k=1
)
.
as (Uˆk,i, Zˆk,i) =
(∏
j∈Q
∏t
ℓ=0 Vˆ
iℓ
jkℓ ,
∏
j∈Q
∏t
ℓ=0 Wˆ
iℓ
jkℓ
)
for each i ∈ Q and k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
For any disqualified player i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\Q, the i-th private key share is implicitly set as
SKi = {(0, 0, 0)}
3
k=1 and the corresponding verification key is V Ki =
(
{1
Gˆ
, 1
Gˆ
}3k=1
)
.
The vector of private key shares is SK = (SK1, . . . , SKn) while the corresponding vector of
verification keys VK = (V K1, . . . , V Kn) and the public key, which consists of
PK =
(
params, {gˆk, hˆk}
3
k=1
)
.
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Share-Sign(i, SKi,M): to generate a partial signature on a message M ∈ {0, 1}
∗ using its pri-
vate key share SKi = {(Ak(i), Bk(i), Ck(i))}
3
k=1, the i-th server first computes the hash value
(H1, H2, H3) = H(M) ∈ G
3 and generates the partial signature as
zi =
3∏
k=1
H
−Ak(i)
k ri =
3∏
k=1
H
−Bk(i)
k ui =
3∏
k=1
H
−Ck(i)
k
The partial signature consists of σi = (zi, ri, ui) ∈ G
3.
Share-Verify
(
PK, V Ki,M, (i, σi)
)
: given the partial signature σi = (zi, ri, ui) ∈ G
3 and the verifi-
cation key V Ki =
(
{Uˆk,i, Zˆk,i}
3
k=1
)
, compute (H1, H2, H3) = H(M) ∈ G
3 and return 1 iff
e(zi, gˆz) · e(ri, gˆr) ·
3∏
k=1
e(Hk, Uˆk,i) = 1GT e(zi, hˆz) · e(ui, hˆu) ·
3∏
k=1
e(Hk, Zˆk,i) = 1GT
Combine(PK,VK,M, {(i, σi)}i∈S): given a (t + 1)-set with valid shares {(i, σi)}i∈S , parse the sig-
nature share σi as
(
zi, ri, ui
)
∈ G3 for each i ∈ S. Then, compute
(z, r, u) =
(∏
i∈S
z
∆i,S(0)
i ,
∏
i∈S
r
∆i,S(0)
i ,
∏
i∈S
u
∆i,S(0)
i
)
by Lagrange interpolation in the exponent. Return the pair (z, r, u) ∈ G3.
Verify
(
PK,M, σ
)
: given σ = (z, r, u) ∈ G3, compute (H1, H2, H3) = H(M) ∈ G
3 and return 1 if
and only if (z, r, u) satisfy the equalities
e(z, gˆz) · e(r, gˆr) ·
3∏
k=1
e(Hk, gˆk) = 1GT e(z, hˆz) · e(u, hˆu) ·
3∏
k=1
e(Hk, hˆk) = 1GT .
The scheme can be proved adaptively secure under the DLIN assumption. The proof is, mutatis
mutandis, identical to the proof of Theorem 1 and omitted here.
Theorem 5. The scheme provides adaptive security in the random oracle model if the DLIN as-
sumption holds in both G and Gˆ. Concretely, for any PPT adversary A, there exist efficient DLIN
distinguishers B1 and B2 in the groups G and Gˆ, respectively, such that
Adv(A) ≤ e · (qs + 1) ·
(
AdvDLIN1(B1) +Adv
DLIN2(B2) +
1
p
)
,
where qs is the number of signing queries and e is the base for the natural logarithm.
G A Construction Supporting Signature Aggregation
In this section, we show how to extend the scheme of Section 3 so as to enable unrestricted signa-
ture aggregation. We consider non-interactive distributed aggregate signatures which are threshold
signatures augmented with two additional algorithms named Aggregate and Aggregate-Verify. The
former takes as input a set of public keys {PKj}
ℓ
j=1 with the corresponding message-signature pairs
{(Mj , σ
(j))}ℓj=1 and returns a constant-size aggregate signature σ. The corresponding aggregate ver-
ification algorithm inputs an aggregate signature σ and a set of ℓ pairs {(PKj ,Mj)}
ℓ
j=1 and returns
1 if and only if it accepts σ as convincing evidence that signer j indeed signed Mj .
The security of an aggregate threshold signature is defined via a game which is identical to the
game of Definition 1 except that, instead of outputting a single message-signature pair in stage 3,
the adversary outputs an aggregate signature σ⋆ and a list of pairs {(PKj ,M
⋆
j )}
ℓ
j=1. Formally, the
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adversary is given public parameters params and interacts with the challenger during the generation
of the challenge public key PK⋆. In the second phase, the adversary is granted access to an adaptive
corruption oracle as well as a partial signing oracle for all servers that hold a share SKi of the
matching private key SK⋆. Eventually, the adversary outputs σ⋆ and {(PKj ,M
⋆
j )}
ℓ
j=1. It wins under
the following conditions: (i) Aggregate-Verify({(PKj ,Mj)}
ℓ
j=1, σ
⋆) = 1; (ii) The set {(PKj ,M
⋆
j )}
ℓ
j=1
contains at least one pair (PKj ,M
⋆
j ) such that PKj = PK
⋆ and, if S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} denotes the set
of players for which A obtained a partial signature on M⋆j , then |S ∪ C| ≤ t.
Here, we assume public parameters params containing two extra generators g, h ∈R G in addition
to those of the scheme in Section 3. The distributed key generation phase is as in Section 3, with the
difference that the players jointly generate a one-time linearly homomorphic signature on the vector
(g, h) ∈ G2 and incorporate this signature in the public key. In the aggregate verification process,
the verifier performs a sanity check on public keys and only accepts aggregate signatures where all
involved public keys contain a linearly homomorphic signature on (g, h).
Looking ahead, these homomorphic signatures will be useful in the security proof when it comes
to extract an ordinary signature from the adversary’s fake aggregate signature. More specifically,
they allow the reduction to recover the contribution of adversarially generated keys to the aggregate
signature in order to remove it from the aggregate. To this end, another solution would have been to
assume registered public keys (as done in Boldyreva’s multi-signatures [10]) and force the adversary
to reveal the underlying private key whenever it generates a public key for itself. We found it more
natural to introduce a built-in proof of validity in each public key.
Dist-Keygen(params, λ, t, n): Given params = {(G, Gˆ,GT ), g, h, gˆz, gˆr, H}, a security parameter λ
and integers t, n ∈ N with n ≥ 2t+ 1, the players proceed as follows.
1. Each player Pi does the following:
a. For each k ∈ {1, 2}, choose random polynomials Aik[X] = aik0 + aik1X + · · · + aiktX
t,
Bik[X] = bik0 + bik1X + · · ·+ biktX
t ∈ Zp[X] of degree t and broadcast
Wˆikℓ = gˆz
aikℓ gˆr
bikℓ ∀ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , t}.
Then, broadcast values
Zi0 = g
−ai10h−ai20 Ri0 = g
−bi10h−bi20 ,
which form a homomorphic signature on the vector (g, h) for the public key (Wˆi10, Wˆi20).
b. For j = 1 to n, send {(Aik(j), Bik(j))}
2
k=1 to Pj .
2. For each received shares {(Ajk(i), Bjk(i))}
2
k=1, player Pi verifies that
gˆ
Ajk(i)
z gˆ
Bjk(i)
r =
t∏
ℓ=0
Wˆ i
ℓ
jkℓ for k = 1, 2. (13)
and e(Zj0, gˆz) · e(Rj0, gˆr) · e(g, Wˆj10) · e(h, Wˆj20) = 1GT . If equalities (13) do not both hold,
Pi broadcasts a complaint against Pj .
3. Any player Pi who sent incorrect verification values (Zi0, Ri0) or received more than t com-
plaints is immediately disqualified. Each player Pi who received a complaint from another
player Pj responds by returning the correct shares {(Aik(j), Bik(j))}
2
k=1. If any of these new
shares fail to satisfy (13), Pi is disqualified. Let Q ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be the set of non-disqualified
players at the end of step 3.
4. The public key PK is obtained as PK =
(
{gˆk}
2
k=1, Z,R
)
, where
gˆk =
∏
i∈Q
Wˆik0 = gˆ
∑
i∈Q aik0
z gˆ
∑
i∈Q bik0
r , Z =
∏
i∈Q
Zi0 R =
∏
i∈Q
Ri0.
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Each Pi locally defines his private key share
SKi = {(Ak(i), Bk(i))}
2
k=1 = {
(∑
j∈Q
Ajk(i),
∑
j∈Q
Bjk(i)
)
}2k=1
and anyone can publicly compute his verification key V Ki =
(
Vˆ1,i, Vˆ2,i
)
as
V Ki =
(
gˆz
A1(i)gˆr
B1(i), gˆz
A2(i)gˆr
B2(i)
)
=
(∏
j∈Q
t∏
ℓ=0
Wˆ i
ℓ
j1ℓ,
∏
j∈Q
t∏
ℓ=0
Wˆ i
ℓ
j2ℓ
)
.
Any disqualified player i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\Q has his private key share (resp. its verification key)
implicitly set as SKi = {(0, 0)}
2
k=1 (resp. V Ki = (1Gˆ, 1Gˆ)).
The public key finally consists of
PK =
(
params,
(
gˆ1, gˆ2
)
, Z, R
)
.
Share-Sign(i, SKi,M): To create a partial signature on a message M ∈ {0, 1}
∗ using his private key
share SKi = {(Ak(i), Bk(i))}
2
k=1, Pi first computes (H1, H2) = H(PK||M) ∈ G×G and obtains
the partial signature as σi = (zi, ri) =
(∏2
k=1H
−Ak(i)
k ,
∏2
k=1H
−Bk(i)
k
)
.
As we can see, Share-Sign is as in Section 3 with the sole difference that the public key is appended
to the message which is actually being signed. Algorithms Share-Verify and Combine are identical
to those of Section 3. We thus focus on the signature aggregation and verification algorithms. For
convenience, we define the standard verification algorithm as a special case of the Aggregate-Verify
algorithm when ℓ = 1.
Aggregate({(PKj , σ
(j),Mj)}
ℓ
j=1): Given a set of triples (PKj , σ
(j),Mj), parse each public key PKj
as PKj = (params,
(
gˆ1
(j), gˆ2
(j)
)
, Z(j), R(j)) and return ⊥ if it does not parse properly. Then,
parse each signature σ(j) as (z(j), r(j)) and return ⊥ if there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} such that
Verify(PKj ,Mj , σ
(j)) = 0. Otherwise, compute and return (z, r) =
(∏ℓ
j=1 z
(j),
∏ℓ
j=1 r
(j)
)
.
Aggregate-Verify
(
{(PKj ,Mj)}
ℓ
j=1, σ
)
: Given a candidate aggregate signature σ = (z, r) ∈ G2, com-
pute (H
(j)
1 , H
(j)
2 ) = H(PKj ||Mj) ∈ G×G for each j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} and return 1 if and only if the
following equality holds
e(z, gˆz) · e(r, gˆr) ·
ℓ∏
j=1
2∏
k=1
e(H
(j)
j , gˆ
(j)
k ) = 1GT .
and, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, PKj =
(
params,
(
gˆ1
(j), gˆ2
(j)
)
, Z(j), R(j)
)
satisfies the sanity check
below
e(Z(j), gˆz) · e(R
(j), gˆr) · e(g, gˆ
(j)
1 ) · e(h, gˆ
(j)
2 ) = 1GT .
Like Bellare et al. [7], we consider a security model where aggregate signatures may involve
multiple messages from the same signer. The proof of Theorem 6 combines the proof of Theorem 1
and ideas of [7].
However, while Bellare et al. [7] prove the security of their unrestricted BGLS aggregate signatures
via a reduction from the security of BLS signatures [14], we need a direct proof under the SXDH
assumption. The reason is that, in the proof of [7, Lemma 3.3], the reduction interacts with a BLS
challenger on input of a public key PKBLS while emulating the aggregate adversary’s challenger.
Whenever the latter makes a random oracle query H(PK||M), the reduction forwards the query to
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its BLS challenger when PK = PKBLS and handles the query itself when PK 6= PKBLS. In the
threshold setting, this approach is problematic because random oracle queries may occur during the
distributed key generation protocol, before the challenge public key PK⋆ is defined. Since PK⋆ is not
necessarily uniform due to the use of Pedersen’s protocol, we cannot trivially rule out hash queries of
the form H(PK⋆,M) during the key generation phase. While Gennaro et al. [42] properly addressed
a similar problem in the static corruption setting, we found it simpler to give a direct proof under
the underlying number theoretic assumptions here.
Theorem 6. The above threshold aggregate signature is secure under adaptive corruptions in the
random oracle under the SXDH assumption in (G, GˆT ). Concretely, any PPT adversary A implies
DDH distinguishers B1 and B2 with comparable running times in the groups G and Gˆ, respectively.
Proof. In order to prove the result, we consider a sequence of games which is similar to that in the
proof of Theorem 1. For each i ∈ {0, 1}, we call Si the event that the adversary wins game i.
Game 0: This game the actual attack game during which all random oracle queries are answered by
returning uniformly random group elements in G2. We assume that all hash queries are distinct.
At the beginning, the challenger B assumes the role of all uncorrupted players when executing the
Dist-Keygen protocol in interaction with the adversary A. When A chooses to corrupt a player
Pi, the challenger sets C = C ∪ {i}, G = G\{i} and reveals the internal state of Pi. From this
point forward, A has full control over Pi and may cause him to deviate from the protocol.
The distributed key generation phase thus ends with the generation of a challenge public key
PK⋆ =
(
{gˆk
⋆, hˆk
⋆
}2k=1, Z
⋆, R⋆
)
. At this point, the aggregate adversary A has also obtained the
vector of verification keys VK = (V K1, . . . , V Kn), as well as the private key shares SKi of all
corrupted players i ∈ C so far and their internal state, including their polynomials Aik[X] and
Bik[X]. In the next phase, partial signature queries (i,M) are answered by faithfully computing
the pair (zi, ri) =
(∏2
k=1H
−Ak(i)
k ,
∏2
k=1H
−Bk(i)
k
)
.
When A terminates, it outputs a purported aggregate signature σ⋆ together with a list of
pairs {(PKj ,M
⋆
j )}
ℓ
j=1. We assume that the adversary queries all hash values {H(PKj ,M
⋆
j )}
ℓ
j=1
before outputting its forgery. We denote by S0 the event that σ
⋆ = (z⋆, r⋆) is a valid forgery.
Recall that S0 implies that {(PKj ,M
⋆
j )}
ℓ
j=1 contains at least one pair (PKj⋆ ,M
⋆
j⋆) such that
PKj⋆ = PK
⋆ and |C ∪ S| ≤ t, where S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} denotes the subset of players that have
generated a partial signature on M⋆j⋆ . If {(PKj ,M
⋆
j )}
ℓ
j=1 contains several pairs satisfying the
latter condition, we define (PKj⋆ ,M
⋆
j⋆) to be the first one in lexicographical order.
At the end of the game, we define the set L as the union of {(PKj ,M
⋆
j )}
ℓ
j=1\{(PK
⋆,M⋆j⋆)}
and the set {(PK⋆,M)}qsj=1 of pairs (PK
⋆,M) such that M 6= M⋆j and A obtained a partial
signature on M . Clearly, the size of L is at most |L| ≤ qs + nmax − 1.
Game 1: This game is like Game 0 with one difference. For each hash query M = (PK||M), the
challenger B flips a coin ϑM ∈ {0, 1} that takes the value 1 with probability 1/(qs + nmax) and
the value 0 with probability 1− 1/(qs + nmax). At the end of the game, B considers the event E
that at least one of the following conditions holds:
– For the message M⋆ = (PK⋆,M⋆j⋆), the coin ϑM⋆ ∈ {0, 1} associated with the random oracle
query H(PK⋆,M⋆j⋆) was ϑM⋆ = 0.
– The list L contains an entry (PK,M) for which ϑ(PK||M) = 1.
Note that B can recognize event E at the end of the game. If it occurs, B halts and reports failure.
Coron’s analysis [20] shows that Pr[¬E] = 1/e(qs + nmax), where e is the base for the natural
logarithm, so that we have Pr[S1] = Pr[S0] · Pr[¬E] = Pr[S0]/e(qs + nmax).
Game 2: We modify the input-output behavior of the random oracle and let the treatment of each
hash query H(PK||M) depend on the random coin ϑM ∈ {0, 1}.
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– If ϑM = 0, B chooses a random αM
R← Zp and defines H(PK||M) = (g
αM , hαM). Note that the
resulting hash value H(PK||M) ∈ G2 now lives in the linear subspace spanned by (g, h) ∈ G2.
– If ϑM = 1, B chooses a uniformly random pair (gM, hM) ∈ G
2 and sets H(PK||M) = (gM, hM).
The same argument as in the proof of Lemma 1 shows that Game 2 and Game 1 are com-
putationally indistinguishable if the DDH assumption holds in the group G. It follows that
|Pr[S2]− Pr[S1]| ≤ Adv
DDH1(B).
In Game 2, we can prove that Pr[S2] ≤ Adv(B)
DP(λ) + 1/p as B can be turned into an algorithm
solving the DP problem, as in the proof of Theorem 1. We actually show that B can use the fake
aggregate signature (z⋆, r⋆) – which involves a message M⋆j⋆ on behalf of PK
⋆ although the sets C
and S are such that |C ∪ S| ≤ t – produced by the adversary to extract a valid ordinary signature
(z⋄, r⋄) on Mj⋆ with respect to the challenger public key PK
⋆. In turn, this forgery (M⋆j⋆ , (z
⋄, r⋄))
can be used to break the DP assumption in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 1.
To extract, an ordinary signature (z⋄, r⋄) from (z⋆, r⋆), B proceeds in the same way as in the
proof of [7, Lemma 3.3]. If ¬E occurs, if we define the subset
W := {(PKj ,M
⋆
j )}
ℓ
j=1\{(PK
⋆,M⋆j⋆)} ⊂ L,
then all pairs (PK,M) ∈ W have been assigned the bit ϑ(PK||M) = 0, which means that H(PK||M)
was defined as (gαM , hαM) for some random αM ∈R Zp chosen by B. It implies that, as long as
PK =
(
{gˆk, hˆk}
2
k=1, Z,R
)
is a valid public key, the pair (zM, rM) = (Z
αM , RαM) is a valid signature
on M w.r.t. PK since (Z,R) is a homomorphic signature on (g, h) (this follows from the linearly
homomorphic property of the scheme in Section 2.3). For all pairs M = (PK,M) ∈ W, B can thus
compute a valid signature (zM, rM) and divide it from the aggregate forgery (z
⋆, r⋆). If τ ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}
denotes the number of occurrences of (PK⋆,M⋆j⋆) in {(PKj ,M
⋆
j )}
ℓ
j=1, B can thus compute
(z⋄, r⋄) =
(
(z⋆ ·
∏
M∈W
z−1
M
)1/τ , (r⋆ ·
∏
M∈W
r−1
M
)1/τ
)
,
which is a valid ordinary signature on M⋆j⋆ by construction.
We also know that, conditionally on event ¬E, for all messages M 6= M⋆j⋆ , the queried hash
value H(PK⋆||M) falls in the subspace spanned by (g, h). This guarantees that B has not leaked too
much information about the private key shares of honest players, which allows applying the same
arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1 when it comes to argue that the DP problem can be solved
with non-negligible probability in Game 2.
When putting the above altogether, the adversary’s advantage can be bounded by
Adv(A) ≤ e · (qs + nmax) ·
(
AdvDDH1(B1) +Adv
DDH2(B2) +
1
p
)
,
where qs is the number of signing queries, e is the base for the natural logarithm and nmax denotes
the maximal number of message-public-key pairs in an aggregate. ⊓⊔
H Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. The proof uses a sequence of three games that begins with Game 0, which is the real game, and
ends with Game 2, where even any PPT adversary A allows breaking the Double Pairing assumption.
For each j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, we denote by Sj the event that the adversary wins in Game j.
Game 0: This is the actual game. Specifically, the challenger assumes the role of all uncorrupted
players during the Dist-Keygen protocol. When A chooses to corrupt a player Pi, the challenger
sets C = C ∪ {i}, G = G\{i} and reveals the internal state of Pi, which includes Pi’s private key
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share SKi = (A(i), B(i)) and the polynomials Ai[X], Bi[X] if the corruption occurs after step
1.a of Dist-Keygen. When a player Pi is corrupted, it may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol.
Partial signature queries (i,M) are answered by honestly running the partial signing algorithm.
At the end of the game, A outputs a message-signature pair
(
σ⋆ = (C⋆z,C
⋆
r , pˆi
⋆),M⋆
)
. We denote
by S0 the event that σ
⋆ = (C⋆z,C
⋆
r , pˆi
⋆) is a valid forgery.
We define A[X] =
∑
i∈QAi[X], B[X] =
∑
i∈QBi[X] and (a0, b0) = (
∑
i∈Q ai0,
∑
i∈Q bi0). At
the end of the Dist-Keygen protocol, the challenger knows the polynomials Aj [X], Bj [X] and the
additive shares (aj0, bj0) of all non-disqualified players j ∈ Q. Indeed, since there is always a
majority of honest players, the challenger receives at least t + 1 shares (Aj(i), Bj(i)) for each
j ∈ Q∩C. As for the remaining players Pj such that j ∈ G ⊂ Q, their polynomials were honestly
chosen by the challenger at step 1.a of Dist-Keygen.
Game 1: In this game, we modify the generation of the public parameters. Namely, the vectors
(f , {f i}
L
i=0) are chosen as f = (f, h) and {f i}
L
i=0, where
f0 = f
ξ0,1 · (1, h)ξ0,2 · (1, h)µ·ζ−ρ0 (14)
f i = f
ξi,1 · (1, h)ξi,2 · (1, h)−ρi , i ∈ {1, . . . , L}
with µ R← {0, . . . , L}, ξ0,1, ξ1,1, . . . , ξL,1
R← Zp, ξ0,2, ξ1,2, . . . , ξL,2
R← Zp and ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρL
R←
{0, . . . , ζ − 1}, with ζ = 2q and where q is the number of partial signature queries. This
change is only conceptual since {f i}
L
i=0 have the same distribution as in Game 0. We thus have
Pr[S1] = Pr[S0].
Game 2: In this game, we raise an event F2 and let the simulator B abort if it occurs. LetM1, . . . ,Mq
be the messages submitted to the partial signing oracle during the game. For each message
M = M [1] . . .M [L] ∈ {0, 1}L, we consider the function J(M) = µ · ζ − ρ0 −
∑L
i=1 ρi ·M [i]. We
define F2 to be the event that either
- J(M⋆) 6= 0
- There exists a message Mj ∈ {M1, . . . ,Mq}\{M
⋆} such that J(Mj) = 0.
We remark that ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρL are chosen independently of A’s view. In fact, the challenger could
equivalently define {f i}
L
i=0 at the beginning of the game and only choose {ρi}
L
i=0 – along with val-
ues {ξ2,i}
L
i=0 that are consistent with {f i}
L
i=0 – at the very end of the game, whenM
⋆,M1, . . . ,Mq
have been defined. The same analysis as [70, 8] shows that Pr[S2∧¬F2] ≥ Pr[S1]
2/(27 ·q ·(L+1)).
This follows from the fact that, for any set of queries, a lower bound on the probability of event
¬F2 is 1/(2q(L+ 1)).
Game 3: We modify the distribution of public parameters. Namely, f = (f, h) is chosen as before
but, instead of generating {f i}
L
i=0 as in Game 2, we choose them as
f0 = f
ξ0,1 · (1, h)µ·ζ−ρ0 (15)
f i = f
ξi,1 · (1, h)−ρi , i ∈ {1, . . . , L}
which amounts to setting ξ0,2 = ξ1,2 = . . . = ξL,2 = 0. If the DDH assumption holds in G, the
above modification should have no noticeable impact on A’s behavior. More precisely, if events
S2 ∧ ¬F2 and S3 ∧ ¬F2 occur with noticeably different probabilities in Game 2 and Game 3, we
can build a DDH distinguisher B. The latter takes as input a DDH instance (f, h, fα, Z), where
α R← Zp and Z = h
α or Z ∈R G. Using the random self-reducibility of DDH, we can create L+ 1
DDH instances (by extending a technique used in [58]) – which are all Diffie-Hellman tuples or
random tuples depending whether Z = hδ or not – and embed them in {f i}
L
i=0 in such a way that
{f i}
L
i=0 is distributed as in Game 2 (resp. Game 3) if Z ∈R G (resp. Z = h
δ). For this reason,
we can write |Pr[S3 ∧ ¬F2]− Pr[S2 ∧ ¬F2]| ≤ Adv
DDH1(B).
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In Game 3, we can show that Pr[S3 ∧¬F2] ≤ Adv(B)
DP(λ) + 1/p as the challenger B can be turned
into an algorithm solving the DP problem.
Indeed, if ¬F2 occurs, the adversary’s forgery σ
⋆ = (C⋆z,C
⋆
r , pˆi
⋆) is a NIWI proof generated for a
perfectly binding Groth-Sahai CRS (f ,fM⋆), which means that B can use logf (h) to extract a pair
(z⋆, r⋆) satisfying e(z⋆, gˆz) · e(r
⋆, gˆr) = e(g, gˆ1)
−1 from the commitments C⋆z,C
⋆
r . At the same time,
for each signed message M 6= M⋆, the NIWI proof (Cz,Cr, pˆi) is generated for a perfectly hiding
CRS (f ,fM ), so that no information about (zi, ri) – and thus the private key shares (A(i), B(i)) –
leaks for these queries.
Also, while A is allowed queries of the form (i,M⋆) to the partial signing oracle, these do not
reveal any more information than the corresponding private share SKi = (A(i), B(i)) itself. We thus
consider partial signing queries for M⋆ as if they were corruption queries. Namely, at the end of the
game, B determines which players have generated a partial signature forM⋆ and moves them from G
to C. For these updated sets G and C, however, B still has the polynomials (Aj [X], Bj [X]) at disposal
for all j ∈ C. Let us consider the aggregated additive shares
aG =
∑
j∈G
aj0 bG =
∑
j∈G
bj0,
aQ∩C =
∑
j∈Q∩C
aj0 bQ∩C =
∑
j∈Q∩C
bj0,
which are the contribution of good and corrupted players to the shared private key. We remark that
the pair (aG , bG) is uniformly distributed in Z
2
p since it is the sum of uniformly random additive
shares chosen by the challenger.
It is easy to see that, conditionally on ¬F2, the term aG is independent of A’s view as long as
|C| ≤ t. This follows from the following facts: (i) Partial signing queries for M 6=M⋆ reveal nothing
about aG due to the perfect WI property of the proof system; (ii) A obtains at most t − 1 shares
of each pair (aj0, bj0), for j ∈ G; (iii) During step 2 of the Dist-Keygen protocol, while relation (2)
provides the adversary with gˆz
Aj(i)gˆr
Bj(i) for each j ∈ G and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the only extractable
useful information is aG + loggˆz(gˆr) · bG . As a consequence, aG remains independent of A’s view as
long as |C| ≤ t.
It comes that B can solve the DP problem as follows. If we define gˆ1,G = gˆz
aG gˆr
bG , the challenger
can use the sum (aG , bG) of its additive shares to compute a pair
(z†, r†) =
(
g−aG , g−bG
)
,
where z† is completely unpredictable by A, such that e(z†, gˆz) · e(r
†, gˆr) = e(g, gˆ1,G)
−1.
Moreover, B can also use the group elements (z⋆, r⋆) extracted from A’s forgery to compute
(z⋄, r⋄) =
(
z⋆ · g aQ∩C , r⋆ · g bQ∩C
)
,
which, since gˆ1 = gˆ1,G · gˆz
aQ∩C · gˆr
bQ∩C , is easily seen to also satisfy
e(z⋄, gˆz) · e(r
⋄, gˆz) = e(g, gˆ1,G)
−1.
Since z† is independent of A’s view, the pair (z†/z⋄, r†/r⋄) forms a non-trivial solution to the DP
instance (gˆz, gˆr) with probability 1− 1/p. Since the DP assumption implies the DDH assumption in
Gˆ, we can upper bound the adversary’s advantage as
Adv(A) ≤
(
27 · q · (L+ 1) ·
[
AdvDDH1(B) +AdvDDH2(B) +
1
p
])1/2
,
which proves the announced result. ⊓⊔
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